This is the Explanatory Memorandum to the Transport Safety Investigation Bill 2002
The Minister protests quite loudly about how "independent" the ATSB will be He mentions the word "independent" or its derivates more than 50 times. Sure, neither the Minister not the Secretary can tell the Executive Director of the ATSB how to conduct an investigation. But they control his budget, decide on whether or not he gets promoted, and can replace him at any time. If you believe that means he is independent, let me tell you about a big bridge that is for sale in Sydney very cheaply if you act fast. ... Boyd Munro
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2002
THE
PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
TRANSPORT
SAFETY INVESTIGATION BILL 2002
TRANSPORT
SAFETY INVESTIGATION
(CONSEQUENTIAL
AMENDMENTS) BILL 2002
EXPLANATORY
MEMORANDUM
(Circulated by authority of the Minister for Transport and Regional Services,
the Honourable John Anderson, MP)
TRANSPORT
SAFETY INVESTIGATION BILL 2002
OUTLINE
The purpose of the Transport Safety Investigation Bill (TSI Bill) is to maintain and improve transport safety in the aviation, marine and rail modes by providing for the:
reporting of transport safety matters;
conduct of safety investigations by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB);
making of safety action statements, including safety recommendations to address safety deficiencies identified by investigations; and
publication of investigation results.
Arrangements in the Bill are based on the principles of international best practice for investigation currently adopted in the aviation and marine transport sectors. Such investigations are:
independent - of other interests such as regulatory and commercial ones;
no-blame - in conduct and outcome to encourage cooperation and reporting on safety; and
open - involving a wide dissemination of findings and the fair treatment of directly involved parties.
This Bill consolidates the ATSBs investigation powers in Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920 and the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations under the Navigation Act 1912 into one piece of legislation. The powers under those pieces of legislation will be repealed upon the enactment of the TSI Bill (refer to notes on clauses of the Transport Safety Investigation (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2002 in this Explanatory Memorandum. In addition, the TSI Bill introduces international best practice investigation to the rail industry on the interstate system consistent with the Commonwealths constitutional powers and the Intergovernmental Agreement on Rail Safety signed with the states and Northern Territory in 1996.
Having one piece of legislation for investigation will serve to:
clarify the ATSBs roles and responsibilities in relation to its objectives for investigations;
update and standardise objectives and administrative arrangements for the conduct of investigations, including a common process for investigation reports;
provide consistent treatment of sensitive information obtained during safety investigations, including disclosure of such safety information in courts and coronial inquests and for Freedom of Information purposes; and
facilitate appropriate multi-modal cooperation with other bodies such as through Memoranda of Understanding and cross-modal use of ATSB investigation expertise.
The Bill has seven parts.
Part 1 - Preliminary: This Part includes the objects of the Bill, its application, both inside and outside Australia, adoption of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code, relationship with other laws, and constitutional limitations on powers and functions. Definitions in the Bill are broadly described to cater for multi-modal requirements and also to avoid unintentionally restricting the ATSBs ability to investigate a particular safety matter. The Bill is intended to prevail over other Commonwealth and State laws to the extent of any inconsistency when necessary to meet the objects of the Bill. Its provisions reflect the Commonwealths primary role within constitutional limits with respect to aviation and large ships and a role in rail investigations on the interstate rail system, which includes those aspects of the intrastate system that may have an effect on the interstate system.
Part 2 - Administration: This Part provides for the creation of the office of the Executive Director of Transport Safety Investigation which has a range of powers under the Bill to conduct safety investigations, including powers of delegation to appropriately qualified people. There is express provision covering independence of action by the Executive Director. Neither the Minister whose portfolio includes responsibility for the ATSB nor the relevant Departmental Secretary may give direction on the exercise of powers under the Bill. This Part also includes provision for Australias compliance with international aviation and marine agreements. Regulation will describe international obligations for marine safety investigation arrangements such as the Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents, adopted by the Assembly of the International Maritime Organisation in resolution A.849(2) and those for aviation under the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation. Annex 13 to the latter (Chicago) Convention prescribes standards and recommended practices for accident and incident investigation adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organisation in 1951 and subsequently.
Part
3 - Compulsory reporting of accidents etc.:
Under this Part, people responsible for
reporting must report matters related to safety.
Non-reporting may result in a penalty of up to a
maximum of 6 months imprisonment for immediately
reportable matters. Regulation will identify
matters to be reported, people responsible for
reporting, nominated officials to receive
reports and the manner of reporting, having
regard to existing arrangements and efficiency
and effectiveness.
Part
4 - Investigations and reports: Division 1 of
this Part provides for the Executive Director to
investigate transport safety matters which are
listed in Clause 23 and describes circumstances
in which the Executive Director cannot
investigate certain transport safety matters. To
appreciate the full scope of the ATSBs powers to
investigate under the Bill, these matters should
also be considered in conjunction with Clause 11
in Part 1, which describes the constitutional
boundaries of investigating under the Bill. The
Division also makes it an offence to hinder an
investigation. Division 2 provides for the
publication of investigation reports where this
is necessary or desirable for transport safety,
the release of confidential draft reports, and
protection of the draft report from further
release including disclosure for the purposes of
legal proceedings or disciplinary actions. The
Bill clarifies that draft reports are not
admissible in evidence in civil or criminal
proceedings, including coronial inquiries. The
same provision applies to final reports (with
the exception of coronial inquiries).
Part
5 - Investigation powers: This Part provides the
powers to investigate, to require attendance
before the Executive Director to answer
questions etc., access to relevant premises,
including accident sites, the detention of
transport vehicles, issue of warrants,
protection and handling of evidential
material and penalties for non-compliance
with some provisions to allow unimpeded conduct
of a safety investigation and to encourage the
free flow of information relating to the
improvement of safety. Additionally, this Part
provides a mechanism for the release of evidential
material that is not OBR information or restricted
information, by the Executive Director to
other agencies.
Certain
provisions in this Part also prevent
self-incrimination being used as an excuse for
not complying with the requirements under this
Part but make any information and evidential
material provided under those provisions,
inadmissible in evidence against the person in
civil or criminal proceedings.
Regulations
will provide for the form of identity cards, and
payment of witness expenses for attending before
the Executive Director.
Part
6 - Protection of OBR information and restricted
information: Sensitive information collected
during the course of an investigation is
separated into two Divisions under this Part.
Division 1 deals with on-board recording
(OBR) information, which cannot be used in
criminal proceedings against a crew member. The
use of OBR information in civil proceedings and
coronial inquiries will be subject to different
restrictions. Other sensitive information
collected during an investigation is afforded
another level of protection and is referred to
as restricted information in Division 2.
Division 3 confirms that the information
gathering powers of the Commonwealth Parliament
and Royal Commissions are not affected.
Part
7 - Miscellaneous: This Part provides
confirmation of the common law general immunity
for the exercise of powers under the Bill,
arrangements for ATSB staff members
participation in coronial inquiries,
compensation for acquisition of property and
provision for the making of regulations.
Regulation will provide further details on
payment of fees for ATSBs attendance at coronial
inquiries.
Financial
impact statement
Existing
Budget allocations for aviation and marine
investigations will be unaffected by this Bill.
However, additional funding for rail
investigations will be required and would need
to be sought for 2003-2004. The minimum amount
required is estimated to be $0.75 million per
annum. This would enable four to six medium
complexity rail investigations to be conducted
each year. The funding arrangements would be
similar to that accorded to aviation and marine
accident investigations, whereby extra funds may
be required if a major accident occurs
justifying a very complex inquiry.
Regulation
impact statement
A
Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) has been
prepared for the rail component of the Bill
only. The Office of Regulatory Review (ORR) was
also consulted on the requirement to prepare a
RIS for the provisions applying to the aviation
and marine transport modes, including on
additional provisions that were incorporated
following a period of external consultation on
an exposure draft of the Bill. However, ORR
advised that a RIS was not required because it
considered that the provisions applying to the
aviation and marine transport modes were not
sufficiently different from existing
arrangements to have a significant effect on
business.
Regulatory
Impact Statement Commonwealth Rail Safety
Investigation Legislation
1. Problem
1.1 Background
On
13 April 2000, the Minister of Transport and
Regional Services issued a media release
relating to the tabling of the Governments
response to four reports on land transport
issues that had been approved by Cabinet. The
Minister said, inter alia:
.
. . rail safety is a priority and the Government
will legislate to enable the Australian
Transport Safety Bureau to independently
investigate accidents and incidents on the
interstate rail system. The reports of such
systemic, no-blame investigations will be
publicly released by the ATSB to allow the rail
industry to benefit from the lessons learned.
The
rail industry has historically developed on a
State basis with vertically integrated
government-owned rail authorities and without
the intention of it becoming a seamless national
activity. However, the rail industry has changed
significantly over the last ten years. The
carriage of passengers and freight by rail is
now seen as an important national and commercial
activity in which State boundaries increasingly
have no meaning. Privately owned corporations
trade, new rail operators travel, and new track
owners rail networks and control systems
routinely operate across State borders.
Initiatives to establish an interstate corridor
are well advanced with the States and Northern
Territory (NT) agreeing on the geographical
limits of the Defined Interstate Rail Network in
the context of the ATC National Rail Summit
Communique, 10 September 1997 and in the 1999
IGA for National Rail Uniformity. In response to
a need recognised in the 1993 Standing Committee
on Transport (SCOT) report, A National
Approach to Rail Safety Regulation, the rail
industry is now moving toward national codes of
practice and other means of standardisation.
However, the adoption of such harmonised
measures, including all aspects of rail safety,
is currently dependent upon the cooperation and
agreement of the various States, NT, and
individual rail industry organisations. Rail
safety investigations and the recommendations
arising out of such investigations, currently
rest with State and NT rail accreditation
authorities. The standardisation of the
investigation of rail accidents, incidents and
safety deficiencies is seen as a measure to
enhance rail safety but an area that is
considered not to have progressed sufficiently.
This concern was acknowledged in a communique
issued by the Australian Transport Council (ATC)
on 19 May 2000, which stated inter alia:
Ministers
note Rail Group strategic issue 8 that:
participants in the rail industry do not openly
investigate and share safety problems and
findings within a no blame safety culture. As a
result, mistakes are often repeated, with
consequential loss of life and injury, thus
reducing rails competitive safety/social
advantage over road. In developing safety
procedures and priorities, there is a need to
better define and reflect community concern for
the avoidance of major accidents particularly
those with injuries and fatalities to
fare-paying passengers.
Deregulation
of transport in overseas countries has prompted
the review and reform of national rail safety
regimes. Those reforms have been characterised
by a number of common features, including the
provision for independent
investigation. independent
rail investigations are conducted in a number of
countries including Canada, New Zealand, Sweden,
and the USA.
The
1996 Inter-governmental Agreement (IGA) in
relation to National Rail Safety was signed
by the Commonwealth, the States and the NT
formalising ATC endorsement of the
recommendations of the 1993 SCOT report. In the
development of that report, the need for a
separate investigatory agency was discussed at
some length. There were divided views as to
whether national arrangements should incorporate
such an agency.
Despite
the differences, ATC agreed that:
prescribed
accidents/incidents should be reported to the
national agency;
there
is a need for a national approach to independent
rail safety investigations;
any
proposed legislation shall provide the
opportunity for an Accredited Owner, Accredited
Operator or a Party to seek the appointment of
an independent
investigator to investigate an accident or other
serious incident involving interstate rail
operations in which death or major damage occurs
(later became clause 8 of the IGA);
an
accident investigation capability should be
included in the national arrangements; and
there
should be a national research/data base
facility.
Since
the IGA was signed two reports have been
submitted to the Commonwealth Government, which
make specific reference and recommendations on
the investigation of rail accidents:
1 The
House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Communications, Transport and Micro-economic
Reform, Tracking Australia (Neville
Report, July 1998) recommended, inter alia, that
the Commonwealth establish a national rail
incident investigation unit.
2 A
report by an independent
industry group Revitalising Rail (Smorgon
Report, April 1999) recommended that the
regulators should be prepared to transfer its
investigation function to an independent,
and possibly multi-modal, agency.
Two
further reports have been submitted to ATC:
3 The
report, independent
Investigation and Open Reporting of Rail
Occurrences (prepared for Rail Group by the
Rail Accident and Incident Investigation Task
Group, March 1999 and endorsed by ATC in April
1999), acknowledged that:
Most
investigation reports are prepared by the
parties involved in the occurrence following
internal investigation. Such investigations may
be perceived as biased or done in such a way
that avoids or fails to expose evidence of
system failures. If the investigations were
undertaken by external investigators with no
association with the parties involved, the
investigation would be said to be independent.
That
report also observed that under current State
laws, there are no requirements for reports to
be made public. It recommended that, if written
in a style suitable for open reporting, safety
investigation reports should be made public in
order to allow for safety lessons to be more
broadly communicated at all levels throughout
the industry, and to demonstrate to the public
that actions have or will be taken to address
any identified safety deficiencies.
4 The
independent
Review of Rail Safety Arrangements in Australia (Booz-Allen
& Hamilton Report, Sept 1999) recommended
that the ATC ministers agree that a separate
Rail Safety Investigations Authority would be
set up with the necessary investigation powers
and research and analytical capability as an independent
unit within the Australian Transport Safety
Bureau (ATSB) in order to ensure that regulators
themselves are subject to appropriate scrutiny
in the case of any major accident or incident.
Standards
Australia has recently completed its work with
industry and governments to develop a proposed
standard on rail safety incident investigation
as part of the AS 4292 series on Rail Safety
Management. Agreement to include the draft
document as a standard could not be reached as
some members of the committee considered that
their organisation, or those that they
represented, would not be able to meet the
intent of the standard or that it could
potentially be used against them in a legal
context. As a result, AS 5022, Guidelines for
Railway Safety Investigation, was released
in June 2001. The ATSB considers that, in its
current form, the guidelines inadequately
reflect best practice procedures for safety
investigation in some areas. The Bureaus
concerns about the inadequacies of that document
are a reflection of similar concerns about the
inadequacies of the current State-based
arrangements for rail safety investigations and
are described in more detail in later sections
of this paper. As AS 5022 is a set of guidelines
only, there are no legal requirement for
compliance with the principles contained in that
document. In addition, only some States call up
the Australian Standard Railway Safety
Management (AS 4292) in their respective
rail safety legislation. As such, even if the
document had been published as a standard, there
would be no legal requirement for some States to
comply with that standard.
1.2 Problem
being addressed
In
all industries, it is recognised that safety
improvements come about, in no small measure, by
the objective analysis of accidents, incidents
and safety deficiencies, and applying the
lessons learnt from that analysis. Open and independent
investigations of safety occurrences in high
risk industries such as aviation, shipping, and
the offshore oil industry, is accepted
internationally as the most effective system in
terms of safety outcomes and the public
interest.
There
is currently no international rail body
equivalent to that of the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) or the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which
may be used as the benchmark of worlds best
practice. This could be attributed to the fact
that rail is essentially a land-locked activity
and not a truly global activity as is aviation
and marine. However, even this argument is
becoming increasingly fragile with, for example,
rail trade and passenger transport activity
spanning the European and Asian continents and
similarly throughout the countries of both North
and South America. In the aviation and marine
spheres, both ICAO and IMO have set
international standards and recommended
practices for, amongst other things, the conduct
of independent
safety investigations. There are currently 185
signatories to the 1944 Chicago Convention,
which includes Annex 13 to the convention, Aircraft
Accident and Incident Investigation -
International, Standards and Recommended
Practices. Most countries, including
Australia, the US, Canada and New Zealand, have
incorporated those best practice principles of
Annex 13, including systemic no-blame
investigation methodology and open reporting,
into their international and domestic
legislation. Over 150 countries are signatories
to the IMO, including Australia, where Assembly
Resolutions A.849 (20) and A.884 (21) make
provision for the conduct of investigations into
marine casualties and near misses. The
investigation principles promoted by the IMO are
similar to those of ICAO.
In
order to illustrate the specific problems being
addressed, the international and largely generic
practices and procedures of both ICAO and IMO
have been used as the benchmark against which to
compare current practices in rail safety
investigations in Australia. A number of
shortcomings are evident in the Australian
context, and are detailed below.
1. Currently,
one of the few completely independent
forms of rail safety investigation is through a
judicial inquiry with the powers of a Royal
Commission. Such investigations are only
appointed in the event of a major accident,
usually involving the loss of life of
fare-paying passengers. Judicial inquiries are
inevitably lengthy and expensive to conduct and
are often adversarial and legalistic in nature.
While they have the virtue of being open to the
public, they are also subject to selective
reporting by the media. Aviation and marine
transport modes have demonstrated that an independent,
technical investigation produces better safety
outcomes. Publishing the reports of such
investigations meets the dual purposes of public
accountability of the investigation and ensures
the industry is provided with the detailed
analysis of the circumstances and contributing
factors to the accident.
2. Other
than judicial inquiries, rail accident
investigations are generally carried out by
either (a) State and NT accreditation
authorities; or (b) by rail companies under
reporting requirements of individual State and
NT legislation. This gives rise to potential
conflicts of interest in which the investigator
may have a direct involvement in part of the
causal chain which led to an accident. In
addition, officers of the regulator may be
investigating an accident or incident that may
have regulatory or organisational deficiencies
as contributing factors, which reflect adversely
on their organisation. Accident investigations
conducted by an individual company may also
present conflicts of interest similar to those
previously described and are often
engineering-focussed, blame-based and
non-systemic. Such investigations tend to be
focussed on legal and financial aspects,
relating to limiting liability or the recovery
of costs from other parties. This can lead, in
turn, to pressure on individuals or teams to
modify reports at the behest of those higher in
the chain of responsibility. It also leads to a
potential reluctance to publicly issue reports
and their findings. Such a demonstrable conflict
of interest leads to a lack of public confidence
in an introverted system of accident
investigation, which is perceived to be neither
disinterested nor transparent.
3. There
is a lack of a uniform approach to rail safety
investigation. In some cases, the powers and
protections offered by some State and NT
legislation, do not provide the appropriate
scope to fully explore all the safety issues and
potentially limit the future free flow of safety
information where an investigation for the
purpose of a prosecution and the safety
investigation process are not able to be clearly
separated.
4. Accidents
are random events that cannot be predicted
either in location or time. Each authority of
itself, does not have the 'critical mass' of
accidents to justify the resources of a
specialist independent
investigation system. This in turn leads to
limited exposure to investigation techniques and
a dilution of expertise. For example, in the
1993 SCOT report, the NSW State rail authority
acknowledged that in ideal circumstances, the
separation of the regulatory and investigation
function is desirable but that budgetary and
other constraints render such an approach
impractical as it often involves duplication,
with an associated cost.
5. It
has become increasingly and publicly
unacceptable to make advancements in rail safety
based solely on the analysis of historical
events that have, at times, had tragic
consequences. The contemporary approach to
investigation recognises the importance of
identifying safety hazards before they become
factors in accidents or incidents. The
investigation of occurrences that could have
affected or might affect transport safety
provides valuable opportunities to seek
proactive solutions to safety hazards. Such
occurrences may not have been the result of the
unsafe operation of a transport vehicle itself,
for example, there may have been a loss of train
control communications or signalling
functionality that does not result in a
reportable occurrence but where safety margins
have nevertheless been reduced.
While
the principles of systemic investigation and
open reporting are seen as desirable by the
States and NT, there is no uniform procedure or
clearly defined mechanism for proactive
investigations.
The
Commonwealth has a major stake in rail safety in
interstate trade. A Commonwealth Government
Business Enterprise owns and operates track and
train control (Australian Rail Track
Corporation). The Commonwealth considers it
vital to foster independent
and objective investigations in the interest of
cost effective rail transport and public safety
and accountability. However, there is no current
legal mechanism that allows the Commonwealth to
investigate in its own right. In contrast, the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada is
responsible, under discrete legislation, for the
investigation of rail safety occurrences on the
national network and the international routes
that cross into Canada from the USA. Canada has
a similar mix to Australia of both federal and
provincial railway networks. While the TSB does
not specifically investigate in the provinces,
agreements are in place with a number of those
provinces in which the TSB renders assistance as
required.
The
publishing and public dissemination of rail
safety reports produced by or on behalf of the
State and NT rail safety accreditation
authorities, is discretionary. The majority of
State/Territory rail safety legislation does not
require reports to be made public. There have
been very few independent
investigations and fewer truly public reports.
As such, many of the important safety messages
are not reaching the working level or the
travelling public. As a result, there is limited
opportunity to apply relevant safety lessons in
other parts of the rail industry in order to
ensure an acceptable level of safety throughout
the industry and eliminate duplicated effort.
Such duplicated effort may have a direct and
significant human and financial cost. In
contrast, for example, all safety investigation
reports completed by the ATSB in the aviation
and marine spheres are made public. There have
been many examples of where findings and
recommendations arising from those public
reports within Australia have been embraced
internationally. Even within Australia, lessons
learnt have been incorporated in a number of
ways including, but not limited to, amendments
to regulations and recommended practices,
changes to design and maintenance, and the
restructure
of relevant organisations to better support and
enhance safety within those organisations.
Issues of commercial advantage arising from the
release of reports are viewed as secondary to
the importance of reducing or eliminating safety
risks.
1.3 Risk
Accidents
are random events that cannot be predicted.
In
1998, 15, 336 rail occurrences were reported
from four States (NSW, Victoria, Queensland,
South Australia). Of these 2,728 or 18%, were
categorised as major occurrences involving
serious injury, death or significant damage
(Rail Accident and Incident Investigation Task
Group, March 1999). The majority of those
categorised as major occurrences were
investigated internally by the companies
involved and reports of the findings were
provided to the respective accreditation
authorities. The remainder of the occurrences
were reported in limited detail to the
accreditation authorities and were used to
identify trends. Only six of the occurrences
were considered by accreditation authorities to
warrant independent
investigation.
The
interstate network, as it is currently defined,
accounts for approximately 8,000 kilometres of
the total rail network in Australia, or
approximately 20% of that network. The
Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC), a
Commonwealth government business enterprise
which commenced operations on 1 July 1998, owns
and/or controls approximately half of that
network. In the second half of 1998, a total of
501 occurrences were reported to ARTC. In 1999,
a total of 1,176 occurrences were reported, of
which 31 were categorised as major occurrences.
It is considered that the remainder of the
interstate corridor would experience a similar
number of occurrences each year.
The
Australian rail system hauls about one-third of
the total net tonne kilometres of freight of the
national rail task, a figure that has increased
by 36% from 1988 to 1997. Interstate freight
tonnage has increased by 27% in the last decade
(Australasian Rail Association website) which
amounts to a total annual revenue of
approximately $500 million. In addition, over
700,000 passengers are carried on interstate
journeys each year (Australasian Rail
Association).
The
social cost of rail accidents in 1988 was
assessed at around $100 million per annum (ATC
1993 report). The independent
Review of Rail Safety Arrangements in Australia (Booz-Allen
& Hamilton Report, Sept 1999) observed that
in 1993, the cost of rail accidents was
comparable to that of air accidents. While that
figure has not been updated, it is expected to
be considerably higher in 2000, particularly if
insurance costs are taken into consideration.
While this figure is considered to be low
compared with the social cost of road accidents
and travel by rail is regarded as a safe mode of
transport, it is significant in absolute terms.
Except
for a handful of examples, investigation reports
produced by companies, accreditation authorities
and even some independent
inquiries that have been instigated by the
States, have not conformed to accepted
best-practice safety investigation principles.
For example, individuals continue to be named in
most reports particularly if they have been
completed by the company involved, the no-blame
philosophy is not reflected as those reports
often continue to attribute a single causal
factor, and there are few public examples of
proactive investigations of safety occurrences.
In addition, there have only been a few independent
inquiries as there is a general view that only
serious accidents need an independent
approach. The risk associated with these
identified inadequacies is that the
investigation reports do not lend themselves
well to public dissemination, they do not
guarantee that safety issues from an
organisational and systemic perspective have
been explored fully, and only a limited number
of serious occurrences are investigated. The
lack of a proactive approach means that death,
serious injury or property damage has often
already occurred before anything is done about
it.
A
national database of rail safety occurrences is
currently being developed by the Commonwealth
with assistance from the States and NT. It is
intended that the database will provide a
national overview of the safety health of the
rail industry, something that has not previously
been achievable under the State-based
arrangements. It will also assist the States, NT
and the Commonwealth to take a more considered
and strategic approach to any emerging rail
safety issues, and will play a role in the
ongoing monitoring of the national codes of
practice once they have been implemented.
Despite the intended benefits of such an
initiative, the States and NT are currently
under no legal obligation to investigate
anything other than predominantly defined events
ie. accidents and incidents in which death or
injury has occurred to persons or where damage
has occurred to, or defects have been identified
in, rolling stock or track infrastructure.
2. Objectives
2.1
Objectives of government action
To
enhance rail safety by creating a national rail
safety investigation regime that meets best
practice, including:
objectivity
arising from;
independence
from regulatory and commercial concerns
unrestricted
authority over the conduct of investigations
the
adoption of a systemic approach where
appropriate;
the
sole objective to improve safety and not to
attribute blame or liability;
certainty
arising from;
uniform
procedures
a
high level of public accountability through
public reporting of all investigations
a
mechanism for proactive safety investigation;
and
a
high level of centralised expertise.
2.2 Existing
regulation/policy
States
and NT
All
States and NT have railway legislation, making
provision for the operation of railways under
their individual jurisdictions. Such legislation
covers all aspects of rail operations under
their separate jurisdictions including financial
and safety issues that, in turn, includes the
investigation of rail occurrences. The same
authorities that oversee regulations, both
commercial and operational, conduct
investigations of accidents and incidents under
their respective legislation.
State
and NT rail accreditation authorities have been
invited to utilise the expertise and independence
of the ATSB. While some States have indicated
that they would utilise this offer, others have
not responded. Further, it is at the various
authorities discretion whether or not they
invite the ATSB to lead or assist in an
investigation. Under such an arrangement, the
ATSB is bound by the State and NT legislation
and there is no guarantee of open reporting.
Officers of the ATSB have been involved in rail
accident investigations on six occasions at the
invitation of the States between 1997 and 2002.
Commonwealth
There
is currently no specific power to regulate rail
safety investigation at a Commonwealth level.
However, there are a number of general powers
which, together, can be used to support
legislation regulating most, if not all, rail
operations.
Through
ATC, the Commonwealth has led the States and NT
in promoting an Australia-wide, uniform rail
policy. This includes developing a consistent
approach to safety issues, including accident
investigation. The Commonwealth is a signatory,
with all other State and NT administrations, to
the Inter-governmental agreement in relation to
rail safety.
Inter-governmental
agreement (IGA) in relation to national rail
safety
Clause
4 of the 1996 IGA states that:
Legislation
shall be passed or appropriate administrative
action under existing legislation taken as soon
as practicable by the Parties which allows for
the application of the Australian Rail Standard
and any additional requirements notified in
Clause 7 as the basis for accrediting safe
operations by interstate rail Operators and
Owners.
Clause
8 of the IGA states that any proposed
legislation:
shall
provide the opportunity for an Accredited Owner,
Accredited Operator or a Party to seek the
appointment of an independent
investigator to investigate an accident or other
serious incident involving interstate rail
operations in which death or major damage
occurs.
As
noted previously, the Commonwealth is a Party to
the IGA.
Australian
Standard - Guidelines for Railway Safety
Investigation
Rail
accreditation authorities and the rail
operators, through Standards Australia, have
developed AS 5022 Guidelines for railway
safety investigation, closely modelled on
the existing Commonwealth marine and aviation
procedures. However, as previously discussed,
there is no legal requirement for compliance
with this guideline by the States and NT,
further contributing to a lack of uniformity.
3
Options
3.1 Status
quo
Continue
to conduct investigations under State and NT
legislation with the rail industry carrying out
the majority of those investigations and with
the balance conducted by State and NT
accreditation authorities. The Commonwealth
(ATSB) would continue to be invited to
participate in or conduct independent
rail investigations at the discretion of the
State and NT accreditation authorities.
3.2 Self-regulation
The
introduction of a system of self-regulation
requiring rail operators, individually or
collectively, to undertake investigations, with
no State, NT or Commonwealth involvement, is an
option.
3.3 Quasi-regulation
Quasi
regulation would involve no legislative powers.
Rail safety investigation could be conducted in
accordance with national codes of practice
and/or Australian Standards/Guidelines, or
through the development of Memoranda of
Understanding between the Commonwealth, States
and NT.
3.4 Commonwealth
government regulation
The
Commonwealth to use its Constitutional powers to
set up a national investigator with coercive
powers in relation to rail safety investigations
on the interstate track and those parts of the
intrastate track that have a safety impact on
interstate operations, analogous to existing
Commonwealth aviation and marine investigation
legislation.
4 Impact
Analysis
4.1 Groups
affected by the problem and proposed solutions
There
are four general groups to be considered:
the
general public;
State/Territory
governments (Departments of Transport and their
accreditation authorities);
the
rail industry; and
the
Commonwealth.
The
general public has the right to expect that rail
occurrences involving death or injury of train
crew or the public, major damage, or damage to
the environment, are properly investigated and
that significant factors contributing to those
occurrences are fully determined. The general
public also has the right to expect that any
resulting safety lessons, which assist to
prevent further similar occurrences, are made
public.
Legislation
and the application of rail safety investigation
methodology varies considerably between State
and NT Governments. The interstate operators are
seeking uniform standards and a uniform approach
to rail safety. This includes a uniform approach
to rail safety investigations and that such
investigations should be separate from the
regulatory functions of the accreditation
authorities.
The
Commonwealth has an existing pool of resources
and a proven track record in systemic no-blame
investigations in the aviation and maritime
spheres. The consistent application of these
principles to the rail industry would meet the
stated objectives as outlined in section 2.2 Objectives
of government action.
4.2 Self
regulation
Rail
operators and track owners already have an
obligation to investigate under their own
management, accidents and incidents involving
company property, systems and/or staff. They
have the appropriate technical expertise and
operating knowledge of the industry and, in
particular, their own company. In addition, it
may be argued that they possess a sufficient
degree of self-preservation and commitment to
safety to ensure that they conduct thorough rail
safety investigations.
The
implementation of this option would necessitate
a repeal of current State-based legislation,
which requires the rail industry to operate in a
co-regulatory environment, a process designed to
apply external safeguards to an otherwise
self-regulated industry.
This
option does not meet the objectives of independence
and objectivity as it would not cater for the
often multiple interests in a rail safety
investigation. These interests would be as
diverse as accreditation authorities, track
owners, operators, maintenance providers,
employee representatives, occupational health
and safety representatives, and the travelling
public. Issues related to conflicts of interest
and the competing goals of safety and commercial
viability are not likely to be adequately
addressed, or be seen to be adequately
addressed, under such a regime. There may be
reluctance to share information in relation to
the findings of an investigation if it is seen
to erode a competitive advantage. All of these
concerns may potentially result in an inherent
lack of confidence in the industrys ability to
investigate itself.
Further
requirements with their attendant costs would be
imposed on the industry, in order that an
appropriate level of expertise for the
investigation of safety issues is assured. Such
a regime would result in greater pressure to
conduct judicial inquiries in the absence of any
formalised system to ensure that public
accountability is at least assured following
serious accidents (Refer to section 1.2
Problem being addressed for other issues
related to the use of judicial inquiries).
4.3 Quasi
regulation
Quasi-regulation
relies heavily on the cooperation and agreement
of all the parties involved and is not legally
binding. Therefore, this option would not wholly
meet the objective of a consistent approach to
rail safety investigation.
Whilst
the agreement and adoption of national codes of
practice for the defined interstate network is
progressing, with parts of the national code
implemented during 2001 and additional parts due
to be implemented during 2002, those codes do
not address the specific issue of rail safety
investigation. The codes were predominantly
developed to address efficiency issues with
passenger and freight operations. Although
safety issues are inherently intertwined with
operational issues, it is considered that rail
safety investigation should be kept at arms
length from a document that sets operational
standards and which may itself be under scrutiny
during a safety investigation.
As
with self-regulation, quasi-regulation will not
satisfy the necessary requirements in relation
to the powers and protections that must be
afforded to investigators and affected parties
to ensure that the primary objective of safety
is able to be rigorously pursued in order to
benefit the industry and the travelling public.
Given
the continued fragmented nature of the industry
and the strong interests of the States and NT,
it is unreasonable to expect that the States and
NT could come to an agreement with the
Commonwealth on the narrow issue of rail safety
investigation, when other rail reform issues
remain unresolved after eight years of the
current reform agenda. This was recently
illustrated when it has become apparent that the
views held by the States, NT and the rail
industry on the proposed draft Australian
standard on Railway Safety Investigation,
were extremely varied in respect to fundamental
issues such as definitions, investigation
methodology, and reporting.
Quasi-regulation
in the form of MOUs between the Commonwealth,
the States and NT, may be beneficial in so far
as it may help to clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of each party in the event of a
rail safety investigation on the interstate
system. This, in turn, may reduce duplicated
effort and resources and any inconvenience to
the rail industry as a result of an unnecessary
further layer of investigation. It may also
allow for a strategic approach in relation to
the expertise that may be required to reside
within a Commonwealth investigatory agency and
which may be able to be
sourced
externally. An MOU may also provide for a
cooperative approach in respect of the uniform
training and development of investigators.
4.4 Explicit
Commonwealth legislation
Commonwealth
legislation would apply only to improve safety
of the interstate rail system. State and NT
authorities would maintain jurisdiction to
investigate intrastate operations, including
urban networks, where the interstate system is
not affected.
The
rail industry is a high-risk operation with the
potential to significantly impact on public
safety and environmental integrity.
The
introduction of proposed Commonwealth
legislation may be viewed as the most formal and
potentially complicated option to implement.
However, this option will meet the objectives as
a legal framework provides certainty,
consistency and specific safety investigation
provisions such as ensuring confidentiality,
protection against self-incrimination,
transparency, and requirements to divulge
relevant information overriding other
requirements not to divulge such information. As
litigiousness increases, the protections of such
legislation may be the only way to ensure that
information from witnesses and other relevant
parties to a safety investigation is
forthcoming.
In
a currently dynamic rail industry, competition
and horizontal structures are replacing
vertical, government-controlled structures. As a
result, critical interface and other safety
issues have been raised for an expanding number
of operators in both above and below rail
operations. An objective, independent,
rail safety investigation capability, supported
by relevant Commonwealth legislation, is
required in this environment to ensure that such
safety issues are properly identified and
adequately addressed.
The
introduction of explicit Commonwealth
legislation with rail safety investigations
conducted by an independent
agency such as the ATSB, has great potential to
bolster public confidence in the rail industry.
With the ATSBs proven track record in other
modes of transport investigation, many expensive
judicial inquiries resulting from the publics
lack of confidence in the integrity of an
investigation conducted by interested parties,
including the accreditation authorities, may be
averted.
Some
accreditation authorities, while welcoming ATSB
assistance, believe that the ATSB needs to prove
the effectiveness of its investigation
methodology to the industry, prior to mandating
it through legislation. Some authorities view
such a proposal as resulting in more unnecessary
power over the States by the Commonwealth and
that any proposed Commonwealth legislation goes
against the intent of the IGA.
The
introduction of any proposed Commonwealth
legislation will come with attendant
administrative costs and, if not handled
adequately, has the potential to result in a
further player added to the already multiple
interests to a rail safety investigation. The
Commonwealth would need to fund its own
investigation capacity (estimated to be a
minimum of $0.75 million per annum). The funding
arrangements would need to be similar to those
accorded to aviation and marine accident
investigations, whereby extra funds may be made
available if a major inquiry justifies
supplementary expenditure. The cost of any rail
safety investigation that falls within
Commonwealth jurisdiction would be wholly funded
by the Commonwealth and therefore has the
potential to reduce the States and NT costs for
investigation and the need for the States to
have the same level of investigation resources.
The
legislation will clearly state the roles and
responsibilities of the State/Territory
governments, rail owners and rail operators in
such matters as:
accident
and incident reporting requirements to the
Commonwealth;
the
requirement to provide information to the
Commonwealth for rail safety investigations; and
the
Commonwealths authority/powers over accident
sites and custody of wreckage.
Reporting
protocols as referred to above, would need to be
established in order to eliminate duplication of
effort resulting in an unnecessary cost to the
industry. An industry education campaign would
need to be conducted and appropriate literature
would need to be distributed to ensure maximum
awareness, understanding and cooperation with
the new Commonwealth regime. These initiatives
could be funded by the Commonwealth at an
estimated cost of $0.75 million per annum.
The
adoption of an independent
organisation reporting publicly significantly
reduces the public expectation for judicial
inquiries. Experience of equivalent Commonwealth
marine legislation, which makes provision for
judicial inquiries, is that the last marine
accident to be subject to a judicial inquiry
occurred in 1985. Since that time, all serious
accidents have been investigated and reported on
by specialist Commonwealth investigators. This
includes accidents involving fatalities and
major pollution incidents.
Whilst
Commonwealth legislation would provide explicit
powers for the Commonwealth to investigate for
rail safety, any benefits or reforms arising
from those rail safety investigations would rely
largely on the cooperation of the State
accreditation authorities and the rail industry.
It is not intended that the Commonwealth would
have the power or responsibility for
implementing safety reforms on the interstate
rail system. If such powers were granted to the
Commonwealth, the Commonwealth investigation
agency would, by default, become a quasi
regulator and in so doing would not be truly independent.
It is intended that the rail safety legislation
would provide for the Commonwealth to identify
and communicate safety deficiencies to the
relevant action agency, with any response from
action agencies, including any intended safety
action being taken by the action agency, being
placed on the public record. This is similar to
the arrangements in the aviation sphere. As the
ATSB is regarded as an independent
and credible investigation agency, records show,
for example, that approximately 80% of its
recommendations have been accepted by the
aviation industry. This approach is also similar
to that of royal commissions of inquiry, in
which there is no legal authority to enforce the
adoption of recommendations. However, business
reality and common sense suggests that such
recommendations cannot be simply ignored and
must be dealt with and acted upon appropriately.
As
the introduction of explicit Commonwealth rail
safety investigation legislation is just one
element of a wider package of reform in the rail
industry, it is not possible to separate the
positive outcomes of sound rail safety
investigation principles from those of other
changes taking place within the rail industry.
It is expected that these reforms which include
such things as increased standardisation in
procedures and technology and improvements in
infrastructure, will compliment this
legislation.
4.5 Impact
in terms of costs and benefits
|
Option
1 Status
Quo |
Public
Rail Industry State Government Cwealth
Government |
|||
|
Costs/disbenefits |
Rail
accident reports not easily accessible to
public, limiting public awareness and
choice Potential
for accidents to be investigated through a
judicial inquiry. Therefore, significant
resource implications, both financial and
human and the potential for the focus to
be on blame and liability. |
Non
uniform approach retained. Interstate
operators are subject to different
legislative provisions and investigation
methodology with the potential to create
confusion and a higher workload for an
operator. Operators
not required to make investigation reports
public. Safety-critical information may be
withheld from industry or other rail
authorities. This has a direct human and
financial cost if the same safety mistakes
reoccur. Potential
for accidents to be investigated through a
judicial inquiry. Therefore, significant
resource implications, both financial and
human and the potential for the focus to
be on blame and liability. Cost
of independent
investigations could be passed on from the
States and NT to the industry. |
Potential
conflicts of interest, leading to lack of
credibility in the investigation process.
Potential
for accidents to be investigated through a
judicial inquiry, with, significant
resource implications. State
and NT expertise may be diluted in so far
as there are insufficient investigations
of a major nature on a State by State
basis. States
and NT not required to make investigation
reports public. Safety-critical
information may be withheld from industry
or other rail authorities. This has a
direct human and financial cost if the
same safety mistakes reoccur. Cost
of any Commonwealth participation in independent
investigations would be passed on the
States. |
Commonwealth
may be seen as avoiding responsibility for
leadership and public good resulting in
political opinion arising against the
government. Any
involvement by Commonwealth in
investigations must rely on current
provisions of State and NT legislation
which do not meet the objectives of best
practice in all cases. Involvement
by Commonwealth in investigations only by
invitation the States and NT (which may
not be forthcoming if politically
sensitive). |
|
Benefits |
No
specific benefits identified. |
No
further implementation requirements. Industry
maintains current relationship with the
States, NT and the Commonwealth. No
requirement to change internal procedures
or rail safety reporting protocols. |
No
further implementation requirements States
and NT maintain current legal
jurisdictions and relationship with the
Commonwealth. No
requirement to change internal procedures
or rail safety reporting protocols. Discretion
to report publicly may enable problems to
be dealt with internally without
unnecessarily undermining the confidence
of the public. |
No
further implementation requirements No
direct financial cost to Commonwealth.
Commonwealth
would maintain harmony with States and NT
as far as is practicable, in respect of
the traditional roles of the States and NT
and the Commonwealth. |
|
Option
2 Self
Regulation |
Public
Rail Industry State Government Cwealth
Government |
|||
|
Costs/disbenefits |
Would
not meet public interest test for safe
rail transport and right to critical
safety information Perception
by public of conflicts of interest and
competing goals of safety and commercial
viability if the rail industry is allowed
to self-regulate in relation to rail
safety investigations. Such concerns are
not likely to be adequately addressed, or
be seen to be adequately addressed, under
such a regime. As a result, public
confidence in the industry could suffer. Greatest
political pressure for accidents to be
investigated through a judicial inquiry
with non-existent or inadequate
legislation and government capability to
investigate. Therefore, significant
resource implications, both financial and
human and the potential for the focus to
be on blame and liability. |
May
not satisfy multiple interests and could
create an unnecessary adversarial climate
between the various parties. Would
not address issues of proper public
accountability Would
not overcome provisions in insurance
policies that information must not be
divulged unless required by law. Therefore
critical information may be withheld. Greatest
political pressure for accidents to be
investigated through a judicial inquiry
with non-existent or inadequate
legislation and government capability to
investigate. Therefore, significant
resource implications, both financial and
human and the potential for the focus to
be on blame and liability. Cost
of any independent
investigations would be passed on to the
industry. Some
rail safety occurrences may not be fully
investigated due to financial constraints. |
Contrary
to existing legislative provisions. Greatest
political pressure for accidents to be
investigated through a judicial inquiry
with non-existent or inadequate
legislation and government capability to
investigate. Therefore, significant
resource implications, both financial and
human and the potential for the focus to
be on blame and liability. Would
require a repeal of current State
legislation. |
Commonwealth
may be seen as avoiding responsibility for
leadership and public good resulting in
political opinion arising against the
government. |
|
Benefits |
No
specific benefits identified. |
Rail
industry free to set own standards and
protocols for rail safety investigation
without influence/oversight of
States/Territories or Commonwealth. Discretion
to report publicly may enable the industry
to deal with problems internally without
unnecessarily undermining the confidence
of the public. Industrys
sense of self-preservation is likely to
ensure well-intentioned efforts to address
safety issues. |
Will
free up resources previously devoted to
investigation, which will enable greater
priority on other matters such as
accreditation processing and auditing. |
No
direct cost to the Commonwealth. Will
free up resources previously allocated to
rail safety investigation. |
|
Option
3 Quasi
Regulation |
Public
Rail Industry State Government Cwealth
Government |
|||
|
Costs/disbenefits |
Limitations
of self-regulation also apply to
quasi-regulation, with consequent affect
on public confidence. Significant
political pressure for accidents to be
investigated through a judicial inquiry
with non-existent or inadequate
legislation and government capability to
investigate. Therefore, significant
resource implications, both financial and
human and the potential for the focus to
be on blame and liability. No
legal requirement for the industry to
conform with safety recommendations
arising as a result of quasi-regulation if
the industry does not want to embrace them
due to financial or other reasons. |
Many
of the same concerns held by the industry
about self-regulation also apply to
quasi-regulation. Significant
political pressure for accidents to be
investigated through a judicial inquiry
with non-existent or inadequate
legislation and government capability to
investigate. Therefore, significant
resource implications, both financial and
human and the potential for the focus to
be on blame and liability. |
Progress
toward a national approach to rail safety
investigation through the use of an
Australian standard is protracted and
States and NT continue to disagree on
fundamental issues. Therefore, possible to
be no closer to achieving the potentially
positive outcomes of a uniform approach. Significant
political pressure for accidents to be
investigated through a judicial inquiry
with non-existent or inadequate
legislation and government capability to
investigate. Therefore, significant
resource implications, both financial and
human and the potential for the focus to
be on blame and liability. Cost
of any Commonwealth participation in independent
investigations would be passed on the
States and NT. Administrative
costs of negotiating and maintaining an
MOU with the Commonwealth that requires
continued cooperation with all the
parties. |
Administrative
costs of negotiating and maintaining MOUs
with several States and NT which requires
continued cooperation with all parties. |
|
Benefits |
No
specific benefits identified. |
May
ensure greater standardisation in the way
the industry is treated by the respective
authorities in relation to rail safety
investigation as the roles and
responsibilities of all the parties are
clearly understood and that there is no
duplication of effort. No
legal requirement to conform with safety
recommendations arising as a result of
quasi-regulation if the industry does not
want to embrace them due to financial or
other reasons. Cooperative
relationships fostered through
quasi-regulation between the States, NT
and the Commonwealth, may have a flow-on
effect on the industry. |
Quasi-regulation
in the form of MOUs between the
Commonwealth and the State/Territory
governments will ensure that roles and
responsibilities of all the parties are
clearly understood and that there is no
duplication of effort. Has
the potential to foster cooperative
relationships between the States, NT and
the Commonwealth. |
Quasi-regulation
in the form of MOUs between the
Commonwealth and the State and NT
governments will ensure that roles and
responsibilities of all the parties are
clearly understood and that there is no
duplication of effort. Has
the potential to foster cooperative
relationships between the States, NT and
the Commonwealth. Fewer
resources required to develop and support
quasi-regulation in contrast to explicit
Commonwealth legislation. |
|
Option
4 Cwealth
Regulation |
Public
Rail Industry State Government Cwealth
Government |
|||
|
Costs/disbenefits |
|
Occasionally,
destructive tests on materials/components
conducted by the Commonwealth, may have an
operational or financial cost to the
industry. It is envisaged that such a
requirement would be infrequent and only
used when considered necessary for a full
understanding of relevant safety issues.
It is not possible to accurately predict
the potential cost of this procedure as it
may range from just a few dollars to
several thousand. However, the cost
associated with such an activity may be
covered by the Companys insurance. Mandatory
reporting requirements require review to
reduce duplication and ensure all the
relevant parties are notified of any rail
safety occurrence/investigation. Custody
of wreckage and power of authority over
evidence would remain with the
Commonwealth investigation agency until
such time as it considered of no further
use to the inquiry. Protocols will need to
be established to overcome any potential
delays to the progress of other
investigations or the restoration of rail
services. For example, access to evidence
would be available under the supervision
of the ATSB and evidence may be
collected/recorded where necessary on
behalf of the ATSB in order to reduce
delays to the restoration of normal
services. |
State
and NT rail safety accreditation
authorities traditional role modified.
States
may provide technical/general assistance
to Commonwealth rail safety
investigations, which may have an impact
on their resources (States would be
compensated in cases where State resources
were requested by the Commonwealth). State
and NT investigations confined
predominantly to intrastate rail. Further
resources may be required to gain the
benefits from the establishment of MOUs
with the States and NT in order to
determine protocols for Commonwealth rail
safety investigation. |
Commonwealth
has an independent
investigation Bureau, ATSB. Cost of some
rail accident investigations would shift
to the Commonwealths investigation agency,
the ATSB at an extra cost of $0.75 million
per annum. Resources
within the allocation referred to above,
would be required to gain the benefits
from the establishment of MOUs with the
States and NT in order to determine
protocols for Commonwealth rail safety
investigation. |
|
Benefits |
Greater
access to safety information. Greater
public confidence in investigation process
and its outcomes. Potential
to avert, in all but the most serious of
accidents, judicial inquiries with their
attendant costs and adversarial
characteristics. |
Create
uniform safety investigation regime where
Commonwealth jurisdiction applies. Greater
public accountability. Potential to
influence issues of liability in civil
proceedings. Greater
potential to make improvements in safety
industry-wide, not just localised within a
particular company or State. Less
impact on resources than the use of
judicial inquiries. |
Will
free up some resources previously devoted
to investigation, which will enable
greater priority on other matters such as
accreditation processing and auditing. Less
impact on resources, both financial and
human, than the use of judicial inquiries.
|
The
ATSB, as a centre of excellence with a
proven track record in safety
investigations, would provide the
Commonwealth, States, NT and the rail
industry with objective rail safety
findings. Ensures
that safety messages are conveyed to the
whole industry and the public. Ensures
that witnesses and other relevant parties
are forthcoming with safety-related
information. A
transparent rail safety regime. Greater
support from the Commonwealth for industry
in safety management and training. Ability
to identify trends and respond in a
proactive manner to developing safety
issues that fall within its jurisdiction
and to relay this information to the
States, NT and the rail industry. Commonwealth
meeting its responsibility for leadership
and public good. The
legislation will support the national
codes of practice as it will provide a
mechanism to identify any safety issues
arising from the implementation and
ongoing operation of those codes. |
4.6 Other
groups potentially affected
Coroners the current relationship between the
States, NT and the respective coroners would be
similar if Commonwealth legislation was enacted.
Therefore, it is considered that there would be
no adverse impact on the work of the coroner.
Some provisions of the proposed legislation will
provide greater certainty to coroners with
respect to access to certain types of
information and assistance from the
Commonwealth. This could be reinforced through
Memoranda of Understanding.
Workcover/Comcare
- Workcover/Comcare have traditionally played an
active role following rail accidents and
incidents. It must be recognised that the
objectives of any proposed Commonwealth rail
safety legislation and that of Workcover and
Comcare are quite separate and must be treated
as such. Whilst the introduction of another
player other than the States and NT would result
following the implementation of Commonwealth
legislation, the relationship would remain
unchanged. On those occasions when the
Commonwealth chooses to investigate, it is
expected that the Commonwealth investigation
will replace that of any State or NT rail
accreditation authority such that no additional
investigation is conducted for a particular
accident or incident than what the rail industry
might normally be subject to.
In
line with similar legislation in the aviation
and marine transport modes, it is proposed that
control of
accident
sites (following the activities of first
response agencies) and protection of sensitive
information would be retained by the
Commonwealth investigation agency. This may have
the potential to delay the progress of other
investigations if not handled appropriately and
may also slow progress toward returning to
normal operations. However, cooperative
arrangements have been established in the other
modes of transport investigation to minimise any
problems arising from such a situation. Such
arrangements could include access to or
provision of evidence and communication of
relevant factual information to other parties as
soon as possible. Similar arrangements could be
applied in the rail safety context.
Insurers In line with similar legislation in the
aviation and marine transport modes, it is
proposed that control of accident
sites (following the activities of first
response agencies) and protection of sensitive
information would be retained by the
Commonwealth investigation agency. This may have
the potential to delay the progress of other
investigations if not handled appropriately.
However, cooperative arrangements have been
established in the other modes of transport
investigation to minimise any problems arising
from such a situation. Such arrangements would
include access to or provision of evidence and
communication of relevant factual information to
other parties as soon as possible. Similar
arrangements could be applied in the rail safety
context.
Rescue
authorities
generally, rescue authorities have the task of
saving lives, providing first aid and to a
lesser degree, returning operations to normal
following an occurrence. Any proposed
Commonwealth legislation would not have an
adverse impact on that role. The proposed
legislation will specifically acknowledge the
need for first response agencies to carry out
those important activities largely unimpeded. It
may be appropriate as part of the ATSBs
educational role, to provide educational
material and training to rescue personnel in
order that they have a clear appreciation of the
requirements
of a rail safety investigation in terms of
preservation of evidence etc.
Australian
Rail Operations Unit (AROU) as
the manager and owner of the proposed national
codes of practice, the activities of the AROU
may be subject to investigation following a
safety occurrence on the interstate network. A
Commonwealth investigation, with a national
rather than State focus, would provide an
opportunity to independently
monitor the finalisation, implementation and
effectiveness of those codes. Safety findings in
relation to the national codes may provide
insight into required changes/improvements to
those codes in order to achieve better safety
outcomes. This impact is viewed as positive
rather negative.
Small
business
It is not considered that small business would
be affected by the introduction of any proposed
Commonwealth legislation.
4.7 Distributional
effects
Given
the increasing value of rail as a method to
transport freight for interstate trade and its
extensive use by passengers, the potential
benefits that have previously been outlined in
this document will affect a significant portion
of the Australian population for a relatively
small cost to the taxpayer. Refer to information
supplied in section 1.3 Risk.
4.8 Data
sources
Australian
Transport Council National Rail Summit
Communique, 10 September 1997
Australian
Transport Council Communique, 19 May 2000
Booz-Allen
and Hamilton, independent
review of rail safety arrangements in Australia -a
report to SCOT, September 1999
Committee
ME/79 Draft Australian Standard for
Comment-Rail safety incident investigation (AS4292.7),
January 2000
Intergovernmental
agreement in relation to national rail safety,
1996
Intergovernmental
agreement for national rail uniformity, 1999
Inter-governmental
working group on rail safety, A National
Approach to Rail Safety - report to SCOT,
September 1993
Rail
Accident and Incident Investigation Task Group,
independent
Investigation and Open Reporting of Rail
Occurrences - a report for Rail Group, March
1999
Rail
Group, independent
investigation and open reporting of rail
occurrences - a report to SCOT, March 1998
Smorgon.
J, Revitalising rail - Report to the
Prime Minister, April 1999
The
House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Communications, Transport and Micro-economic
Reform, Tracking Australia - Neville
Report, July 1998
5 Consultation
5.1 Affected
parties
The
following rail organisations have been
consulted:
Australasian
Railway Association Inc.
AROU
Advisory Group
Interstate
Rail Operators Group
FreightCorp
Australian
Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union
Australian
Services Union
National
Rail Corporation Ltd
Australia
Southern Railroad
Great
Southern Railway
Australian
Rail Track Corporation
The
State rail accreditation authorities of NSW,
Vic, SA, WA, Qld and NT
Individual
meetings were held with some industry operators
and other industry organisations. Proposals have
also been discussed at accreditation authority
and Rail Group, SCOT and ATC meetings.
In
September 2001, comment from the rail industry
was sought on an Exposure Draft of the proposed
legislation. A multi-modal industry consultation
workshop was held in Canberra on 21 September
2001 to brief the aviation, marine and rail
industry on the proposed provision of the new
legislation. A number of comments were received
from interstate operators and State and
Territory regulatory authorities. The ATSB has
sought to accommodate to the extent possible a
number of concerns raised by those parties
within a revised version of the Bill and will
work with the industry and regulatory
authorities to develop agreed protocols through
Memoranda of Understanding. Consultation has
also occurred with occupational health and
safety bodies.
5.2 Affected
parties views
Operators
and industry organisations
Operators
and industry organisations are generally in
support of Commonwealth legislation with the
following reservations and concerns:
Another
layer of investigation in addition to the many
and varied interests of other investigation
bodies eg Workcover, company, EPA, insurers
etc.;
Protection
of witnesses some organisations were supportive
provided that the legislation provides
protection to witnesses against the use of
information provided to the investigation in
criminal or civil proceedings; and
A
definition of what constitutes Commonwealth
jurisdiction, for example, geographical corridor
v interstate trade needs to be established.
Traditional
concerns that have prompted support of the
proposal to implement Commonwealth legislation
include the following issues:
Lack
of standardisation compounded by the fact
operators may be accountable to several State
jurisdictions;
An
opinion that investigations are still conducted
primarily for the purpose of blame or liability
despite progress in this area. The Glenbrook
inquiry was sited at several meetings as an
example of an accident inquiry seeking to
apportion blame and liability;
Limited
public reporting of investigations resulting in
safety messages not being widely spread; and
That
Commonwealth jurisdiction should be as wide as
possible.
Other
positive comments from rail industry include the
following aspects:
The
development of a national database of rail
accident/incident statistics coordinated by the
ATSB. Many operators see this as a good
opportunity to ensure that safety issues are
identified at a national level and safety
messages disseminated widely. Also,
opportunities for benchmarking.
The
Commonwealths established reputation/track
record as an independent
investigation agency in other modes will be able
to be utilised in the rail industry.
State/Territory
rail safety accreditation authorities
Accreditation
authorities concerns about proposed Commonwealth
legislation include the following:
the
proposal would result in more unnecessary power
over the States;
the
initiative is contrary to the intent of the 1996
IGA;
the
current regime is adequate and there is a wish
to maintain discretionary powers over the terms
of reference and whether or not individual
investigation reports are publicly released;
the
States and NT are progressively improving their
rail safety legislation to embrace the
principles of open, independent,
no-blame, systemic investigations; and
the
ATSB needs to prove the effectiveness of its
investigation methodology to the industry, prior
to mandating it through legislation.
6
Conclusion and recommended option
6.1 Option
four is the preferred option
By
adopting this option, it is considered that the
following benefits outweigh the
costs/disadvantages that have been identified.
This option:
provides
for the demonstrable independence
of the investigating process, while providing
the capacity for State authorities to remain
involved in rail safety investigations, under
ATSB leadership, through Memoranda of
Understanding;
a
nationally consistent approach with the use of a
well-proven model for investigation used in
other transport modes within Commonwealth
jurisdiction and high risk industries
internationally;
provides
certainty through a legislated requirement for
transparency that, in turn, ensures that safety
information is distributed to all areas of the
rail industry and the general public;
maximises
potential benefit for travelling public
including public confidence and accountability
issues;
enables
the development of a pool of professional,
dedicated resources, concentrated in the one
centre trained in contemporary investigation
techniques and the management of complex
investigations as a national resource for rail
safety investigation and investigator training;
is
consistent with recommendations made by recent
public reports; and
Governments
stated policy to introduce Commonwealth
legislation for the investigation of rail safety
occurrences as part of the reform program for
interstate rail.
6.2 Implementation
and review
The
preferred option will need to be implemented
through the introduction of a discrete
Commonwealth rail investigation Bill. The Bill
will be clear and comprehensive in defining the
responsibilities of the Commonwealth, the State
and Territorial governments, and rail operators
and track owners, in relation to rail safety
investigations.
Before
the legislation is finalised, ATSB will hold a
workshop with interstate rail operators and the
State and Territory Departments of Transport to
consider the legislation and the procedures that
will be followed to ensure major stakeholder
interests are fully considered and to avoid
unnecessary overlap or duplication of existing
arrangements.
Following
enactment of the legislation, ongoing review of
its application against its objective will occur
through consultation with major stakeholders at
the Rail Safety Consultative Forum (RSCF) SCOT
and ATC forums, and through direct consultation
with the rail industry. Investigation reports
are to be available on the ATSB's website
together with other educational material to
promote rail safety. The ATSB's Annual Review
will report on progress of implementation of the
legislation.
TRANSPORT SAFETY INVESTIGATION BILL 2002
NOTES
ON CLAUSES
Part
1 - Preliminary
Clause
1 Short title
This
clause provides the proper title of the Bill.
Clause
2 Commencement
This
clause provides that the Bill commences on the
date of proclamation or the expiration of six
months after it receives Royal Assent, whichever
is earlier. This period will allow sufficient
time for the completion of the drafting of the
regulations, which will need to commence at the
same time as the Bill.
Clause
3 Definitions
This
clause defines certain terms used in the Bill.
In particular:
Accident is defined to cover more serious
occurrences involving death, serious injury,
destruction or serious damage of vehicles or
property. The definition serves to distinguish
more serious occurrences from other incidents or
situations. Where an accident has occurred, the
Executive Director may exercise certain coercive
powers in respect of the accident site and
accident site premises, in addition to powers,
which are available in relation to premises that
are not accident sites. (Refer also to the
definitions of accident site, accident
site premises and special premises).
Commonwealth
place
includes all places acquired by the Commonwealth
for public purposes, but does not include the
Australian Capital Territory.
Constitutional
corporation
may be a foreign corporation (ie. company formed
outside the limits of the Commonwealth) or a
trading or financial corporation formed within
the limits of the Commonwealth. This term is
also defined to include any body corporate
formed in a Territory (ie. regardless of whether
or not it is carrying out trading or financial
activities).
Control
area
is a generic name being used for the purposes of
this Bill. It will include, for example:
in
aviation - the flightdeck of an aircraft
in
marine - the bridge of a ship
-
the machinery control room of a ship
-
the cargo control room of a ship
in
rail - the locomotive cab of a rail
vehicle
Note
that control area is not intended to
cover such facilities as air traffic control
centres or equivalent facilities in other modes.
Refer also the Explanatory Memorandum comments
at Clause 48.
Court is defined to mean any person or body that
has power to require the production of documents
or answering of questions. This will include,
for example, the Administrative Review Tribunal
or a coroner, but the definition expressly
excludes the Parliament or a Royal Commission so
that the restrictions under the Bill which are
applicable to provision of evidence for purposes
of court or tribunal proceedings, will not apply
to Parliamentary or Royal Commission
proceedings.
Crew
member
may include such persons who are employed (or
engaged under contract) as the technical Flight
Crew and Cabin Crew of an aircraft, the Master
and seagoing crew of a ship, or the Driver,
Second Person or Guard and Conductor of a rail
vehicle, and who are on board the respective
transport vehicle at the time that it is
operating. For further explanation, refer also
to the Explanatory Memorandum comments on the
definition of operational duties.
Evidential
material
means anything that may be relevant to an
investigation conducted under the Bill. Evidential
material includes on-board recordings
and restricted information (such as
interview notes, results and analysis of tests,
personnel records, electronic data and other
recorded information, medical records and
autopsy results). Refer also to the Explanatory
Memorandum comments on the definition of restricted
information and further comments at Clauses
60, 61 and 62. In addition, evidential
material may include information that is not
restricted information such as fuel and
maintenance records, photographs, log books etc.
and physical evidence such as components of
transport vehicles, wreckage of transport
vehicles and baggage.
On-board
recording or
OBR is defined by reference to Clause 48
which sets out the conditions to be met before a
recording may be regarded as an OBR within the
meanings of the Bill. A Cockpit Voice Recording
(CVR), as referred to in aviation, is one
example of an OBR. Note that a recording becomes
an OBR only upon the happening of an Immediately
Reportable Matter as prescribed by the
regulations. However, once an Immediately
Reportable Matter has occurred, the entire
recording becomes an OBR, including parts of the
recording made prior to the time of the
occurrence, unless and until such time as the
Executive Director declares that the recording
ceases to be an OBR (see Clause 49). Also note
that as long as a recording falls within the
definition of an OBR, the protection and
restrictions under Part 6 apply.
Operational
duties
are those duties that a person is designated to
carry out in order to safely and efficiently
operate a vehicle on an assigned task, such as
the carriage of passengers or cargo, from one
destination to another. It requires such persons
to operate the transport vehicle within its
prescribed performance limits, to ensure that
any passengers are supervised and assisted
throughout the operation of a transport vehicle
including emergency evacuations, and to observe
laws and standard operating procedures
applicable to that transport vehicle.
Restricted
information
covers various types of information acquired by
a staff member under or in connection with the
Bill, not including OBR information. Restricted
information is a subset of evidential
material and is sensitive information that
may have an adverse impact on the free flow of
safety information in the future (and in turn
have a substantial adverse impact on the proper
and efficient conduct of an investigation
conducted under this Bill) if it was made freely
available by the Executive Director for purposes
other than transport safety, such as blame
inquiries.
The
exclusion of OBR information from the definition
is to separate the protection of unique OBR
information from the protection of other types
of information obtained by the Executive
Director for purposes of the Bill.
Note
that the disclosure and admissibility of restricted
information is subject to the provisions of
Part 6 Division 2-Restricted Information.
State
referral of power
means a referral by a State to the Commonwealth
allowing the Commonwealth to legislate in
respect of a certain subject matter which is not
normally within the Commonwealths legislative
power under the Commonwealth Constitution.
Clause
4 Act binds the Crown
This
clause provides that the Crown in right of the
Commonwealth and all the States and Territories
is subject to the Bill, but it cannot be
prosecuted for an offence under the Bill.
Clause
5 External Territories
This
clause provides that the Bill applies in all
external Territories, eg. Christmas Island,
Norfolk Island etc.
Clause
6 Application outside Australia
This
clause provides that the Bill applies outside
Australia, unless there are provisions in the
Bill, which provide otherwise. This means the
Bill authorises the Executive Director to do
anything in a foreign country where he or she is
authorised to do the same thing in Australia.
For example, an Australian flight crew stationed
in a foreign country may be subject to the
provisions of Clause 32 of this Bill ie.
requirement to attend before the Executive
Director. However, it should be noted that
subjects of foreign countries are under no
obligation, when they are outside Australia, to
comply with provisions of the Bill and therefore
it may not be possible in those cases to enforce
provisions requiring compliance with the Bill.
Clause
7 Objects of this Act
This
clause sets out the objects of the Bill. In
general, the main object will be to determine
the events and factors, both immediate and
underlying, relating to a transport safety
matter that has been investigated under the
Bill. In doing so, safety deficiencies in the
transport system may be identified and relevant
safety action statements, including safety
recommendations to address those safety
deficiencies, may be made by the Executive
Director in order to improve transport safety.
There will be public reporting of transport
safety matters, particularly including
investigation findings in the interests of
transport safety. Such reporting may also
include studies of trends in accidents and other
occurrences that have been reported to the
Executive Director.
An
additional object of the Bill is for the
Executive Director to cooperate with other
Commonwealth agencies or persons having powers
under another law of the Commonwealth to also
investigate the same matter as that being
investigated under the Bill. This will include
agencies such as the AFP, AMSA, CASA and
Comcare. Other provisions within the Bill,
notably Clauses 24, 43, 44 and 45, reinforce the
notion of cooperation by providing specific
defences against penalties to allow such parties
and others to carry out their statutory
responsibilities and to provide a mechanism for
the provision of evidence in the possession of
the Executive Director to other parties on
request. However, whilst the Executive Director
will cooperate with those parties to the extent
possible, this provision must be read in
conjunction with other provisions within the
Bill, particularly Parts 5 and 6, which may
place some necessary limitations on otherwise
unfettered cooperation in the interests of
transport safety and in ensuring separation
between no-blame investigations and a process
that may lead to blame or liability.
The
objects of the Bill will NOT be to determine
blame or liability of a person. Note that the
term person may include a body corporate. In
addition, no adverse inference is to be drawn by
the fact that a particular operator may be
subject to an investigation of a transport
safety matter under this Bill. Note also that
the Bill (see Clause 17) is the mechanism for
Australia complying with international
agreements including for aviation, Annex 13 to
the Convention on International Civil Aviation -
International Standards and Recommended
Practices for Aircraft Accident and Incident
Investigation. Article 94(7) of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, IMO Resolution
A.849(20), SOLAS (IMO Convention for the Safety
of Lives at Sea) & MARPOL (IMO Convention of
Marine Pollution) outline international
agreements for ships and marine navigation.
Clause
8 Application of Criminal Code
This
clause provides that Chapter 2 of the Criminal
Code (which is found at the Schedule to the Criminal
Code Act 1995) applies to offences against
this Bill. Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code
contains all the general principles of criminal
responsibility that apply to any offence,
irrespective of how the offence is created.
Chapter 2 covers elements of an offence,
circumstances in which there is no criminal
responsibility, extensions of criminal
responsibility, corporate criminal
responsibility, and proof of criminal
responsibility.
Subclause
8(2) means that the offences under the Bill may
apply outside the geographical limits of
Australia in accordance with section 15.4 of the
Criminal Code. Under section 15.4, there
is no need for the offending conduct to have any
connection with Australia, and the fact that the
conduct is not a crime under the law of the
foreign country where the conduct occurred
cannot be used as a defence.
Clause
9 Penalties specified at foot of sections or
subsections
This
clause provides that where a provision creating
an offence specifies a maximum penalty for an
offence, then the offence is punishable by a
penalty up to the maximum specified. This is so
irrespective of whether the provision specifying
the maximum penalty is a clause or a subclause
of this Bill, or whether the offence is created
expressly.
Clause
10 Relationship with other laws
Subclause
10(1) makes it clear that the Bill is not
intended to cover the field of transport safety
investigation. This provision means that the
Bill does not prevent a State or a Territory
from conducting their own investigation into
safety, disciplinary or administrative matters
under their own legislation as long as that
legislation is not directly inconsistent with
this Bill. Therefore, State and Territory
authorities, which have jurisdiction to
investigate, will be able to do so, in parallel
to any investigation under this Bill if
necessary. The only occasion when this Bill has
primacy over State or Territory laws is when
there is inconsistency with the State or
Territory legislation, eg. when the operation of
that legislation hampers an investigation
conducted under this Bill. For example, both
State laws and this Bill may allow investigators
to seize evidential material at accident
site premises. In such cases, the Executive
Director will have primacy over the State laws.
However the Executive Director will endeavour to
work cooperatively with the State and Territory
authorities in order that they are able to
conduct their own investigations. Note that if
the Commonwealth elects not to investigate,
State and Territory authorities will not be
precluded from conducting their own
investigation into the matter in whatever form
or forms. Also note that Clause 45(6) allows for
evidential material that is not OBR
information or restricted information to
be provided to other agencies such as regulatory
bodies, police, coroners and occupational health
and safety (OH&S)authorities. Other
provisions in Part 6 of the Bill deal with the
disclosure and admissibility of OBR information
and restricted information to other
agencies.
The
potential to save lives through an unimpeded
transport safety investigation is imperative,
consistent with Australias international
obligations and in the interests of the
continued free flow of safety information. It
must be recognised that 90% of accidents and
incidents are a result of human or technical
factors where no malice was intended and that
only a very small proportion of accidents are
the result of serious criminal activity where
there was an intention to harm other persons
and/or property. It is the former types of
operational accidents and incidents that the
ATSB focuses on and has the expertise to
investigate. Recent experience overseas
emphasises the need for agencies to cooperate to
the extent possible and to acknowledge that
where an accident was not the result of a
serious crime, the recognised independent
safety investigation agency should be the lead
agency. This means that the ATSB must be able to
direct and control safety investigation
activities beyond those required in the first
response phase following a transport accident
and to coordinate with other agencies to the
extent possible to allow those agencies to
achieve their respective objectives. Equally, it
is be recognised that on those rare occasions
such as September 11, 2001 in New York and
Washington, when serious criminal (terrorist)
activity caused four fatal aircraft crashes, the
relevant law enforcement agency will be the lead
agency. It is noted that under the Annex 13
definition of an accident, obvious cases of
terrorism such as those cited in this example,
are not considered to be accidents and safety
investigation agencies such as the ATSB would
not routinely investigate such occurrences. In
such cases, the ATSB would provide whatever
expertise and support it was able to assist the
Australian Federal Police and other authorities.
There
will be some occasions when it is not
immediately apparent whether a transport
accident was the result of human and/or
technical failure or the result of a serious
crime. The Airbus 300 accident in New York
(November 2001) which resulted in 260
fatalities, was a case in point. On that
occasion, a public announcement was made early
in the investigation that until there was
evidence to suggest that the accident was the
result of a crime, the US National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) would remain
the lead agency. That arrangement worked well
and is being reflected in protocols in an MOU
that is under development between the NTSB and
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Subclause
10(2) provides that the Bill prevails over other
Commonwealth legislation, including any other
legislation allowing Commonwealth agencies or
authorities other than the Executive Director to
conduct an investigation into a transport safety
matter, to the extent of any inconsistency.
However, it is assumed that Commonwealth laws
are compatible and can operate concurrently.
Therefore, this Bill does not exclude
Commonwealth agencies from investigating a
transport safety matter, in parallel if
necessary, as long as that legislation does not
hamper an investigation conducted under this
Bill. For example, another Commonwealth Act may
have similar provisions to this Bill, which
state that certain powers may be exercised under
warrant in relation to evidence collection. This
Bill would have primacy over the evidence
collected under those provisions only in those
cases where the ED considered that the operation
of those provisions hampered an investigation
under this Bill. Notwithstanding, the Executive
Director will endeavour to work cooperatively
with other Commonwealth authorities in order
that they are able to conduct their own
investigations with little or no impediment in
accordance with current practice.
For
further reasons for primacy over other
legislation, refer also to comments at Subclause
10(1).
Clause
11 Constitutional limitations on powers and
functions
This
clause prescribes the limits, as consistent with
the Commonwealths constitutional power, within
which the powers under the Bill may be exercised
in relation to each mode of transport, including
aviation, marine and rail. The use of the
purpose limitation will make it easier to apply
a generic set of laws to all three modes of
transport.
Subclause
11(1) relates to aviation safety investigation
and is consistent with the Commonwealths
constitutional power to legislate in respect of
external affairs, trade and commerce with other
countries and among the States, foreign
corporations and trading or financial
corporations formed within the limits of the
Commonwealth, matters referred to the
Commonwealth by any State or States, power to
legislate in respect of territories and
Commonwealth places and in respect of any other
matter to which the Commonwealth has the power
to make laws. The Commonwealths wide
constitutional power to make laws relating to
air navigation has been confirmed by court
decisions such as Airlines of New South Wales
Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (Airlines No.2
(1965) 113 CLR 54).
Subclause
11(2) relates to marine safety investigation and
is consistent with the Commonwealths
constitutional power to legislate in respect of
external affairs, trade and commerce with other
countries and among the States, foreign
corporations and trading or financial
corporations formed within the limits of the
Commonwealth, matters referred to the
Commonwealth by any State or States, power to
legislate in respect of territories and
Commonwealth places and in respect of any other
matter to which the Commonwealth has the power
to make laws. For instance, based on the
external affairs power, the Bill will allow
investigation into occurrences involving
intrastate operations as long as they are
operating outside the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
(Refer to Subclause 11(5)). For example, an
intrastate ship that is operating from Brisbane
to Weipa along the Great Barrier Reef could be
investigated under this Bill if it was involved
in an investigable matter (Refer to Clauses 22
and 23).
Subclause
11(3) relates to rail safety investigation and
is consistent with the Commonwealths
constitutional power to legislate in respect of
trade and commerce among the States, and of the
Northern Territory. It is also consistent with
the Commonwealths constitutional power to
legislate in respect of foreign corporations and
trading or financial corporations formed within
the limits of the Commonwealth, matters referred
to the Commonwealth by any State or States,
power to legislate in respect of a Commonwealth
place and in respect of any other matter to
which the Commonwealth has the power to make
laws. The subclause does not contain provisions
to reflect the Commonwealths power to make laws
with respect to external affairs. This is due to
the lack of international element at present in
the context of rail transport. The Bill would
also cover intrastate operations if the
Executive Director considered that there was an
impact on the safety of operations on the
interstate rail system. For example, an
intrastate train may collide with an interstate
train on the Defined Interstate Rail Network
(DIRN), or an intrastate train may be involved
in a single-vehicle safety occurrence on the
DIRN, or there may be an accident on track that
is not considered part of the DIRN but is being
used for interstate operations. Note that the
Northern Territory is referred to in this
subclause but not the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT) as there is no part of the
current interstate rail track within the ACT.
Subclause
11(4) clarifies that the constitutional limits
imposed under Clause 11 are only relevant and
applicable in relation to the exercise of powers
under the Bill. The constitutional limits
regarding the protection of OBRs and OBR
information are provided separately under Clause
48.
Subclause
11(5) makes it clear that for the purposes of
Clause 11 only, outside Australia means
outside the baseline from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured. In other words,
the territorial sea is considered outside
Australia for purposes of Clause 11. This
definition has been adopted to ensure that the
Commonwealths external affairs power can be
invoked to the maximum extent possible for the
purposes of the Bill. However, any references to
Australia in other provisions of the Bill, for
example, Clauses 22, would have the ordinary
meaning in accordance with Section 15B of the Act
Interpretation Act 1901 which includes the
coastal sea (including the territorial sea) of
Australia. In other words, the territorial sea
would be considered within Australia for
purposes of all other provisions of the Bill.
Part
2 - Administration
Clause
12 Executive Director of Transport Safety
Investigation
This
clause creates the office of the Executive
Director of Transport Safety Investigation. The
incumbent of this office will be a public
servant appointed by the Secretary of the
Commonwealth Department within which the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) exists
for administrative purposes by reference to
Clause 77 of the Public Service Act 1999.
It is anticipated that the Executive Director
would be a member of the Senior Executive
Service of the Department. The Executive
Director will be accountable to the Secretary in
matters relating to the operation of the Public
Service Act 1999 and other
legislation such as the Financial Management
and Accountability Act 1997. Refer also to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause 15 for
an explanation of the level of independence
that the Executive Director has in relation to
the exercise of powers under this Bill.
Clause
13 Delegation
Subclause
13(1) permits the Executive Director to delegate
all or any of his or her powers under the Bill
to any suitably qualified person, subject to the
limitations provided under this clause. A
suitably qualified person may be a Commonwealth
or State/Territory officer or a private
individual with appropriate qualifications and
experience. This is an acknowledgment of the
need to maintain transport safety as a priority
over what might otherwise be considered in other
statutes as unacceptable protocol to delegate
powers to anyone other than a Commonwealth
officer and allows Australia to meet
international obligations in respect of aviation
and marine safety investigations. This
flexibility is essential as it may be necessary,
for example, in remote locations to delegate
powers to an appropriately qualified person in
order that perishable evidence is collected in a
timely fashion and that witnesses are
interviewed quickly before their memory becomes
less reliable. In such cases, only those powers,
or aspects of those powers, seen as necessary to
adequately carry out investigative functions on
behalf of the Executive Director under this
Bill, would be bestowed on those persons. To
ensure the Executive Director maintains control
over the manner in which the delegated powers
are exercised, the delegation may be conditional
upon the delegate complying with the Executive
Directors directions given under Subclause 13(7)
in relation to the exercise of the powers by the
delegate. The Executive Director may also limit
the scope of any delegation by limiting the
powers to be delegated depending on the
qualification and experience of the individual
concerned. The Executive Director may also
revoke a delegation at any time if he or she
believes it is necessary or desirable to do so.
Refer
also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at
Clause 14 Special Investigators.
Subclause
13(2) provides that the Executive Directors
power under Clause 14 to appoint a special
investigator and in respect of Clause 25 to
release final reports on investigations, cannot
be delegated. In other words, only the Executive
Director himself or herself may appoint a
special investigator for any particular
investigation and release final reports on
investigations.
It
was considered appropriate that only the
Executive Director be able to delegate powers to
special investigators, after careful
consideration of the need (see Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Subclause 13(1)), as
those investigators may be other than APS
employees and are therefore not subject to the
same controls as APS employees.
Release
of reports under Clause 25 reflects current
practice in respect of the public release of
investigation reports.
Subclause
13(3) provides that the powers in relation to
the requirement, by written notice, for
attendance and/or production of documents may
only be delegated to those persons identified in
that subclause, including special
investigators.
Subclause
13(4) provides that the power to apply for a
warrant may only be delegated to those persons
identified in that subclause but does not
include special investigators.
Subclause
13(5) provides that the power to enter
residential premises under warrant may only be
delegated to a Commonwealth officer. The
requirement to act quickly or to comply with
international obligations were not considered
relevant arguments in the case of residential
premises. It was therefore determined that
standard Commonwealth policy in respect of
delegations should apply to residential premises
powers.
Subclause
13(6) places a responsibility on the Executive
Director to ensure powers are not delegated to
someone who will not exercise them in a
responsible manner consistent with the
provisions of this Bill. The Executive Director
must carefully consider the need to delegate.
Since the Executive Director is ultimately
responsible for the application of this Bill, it
is in his or her interest to maintain the
integrity of the process of delegations by
making a determination about the suitability of
any particular person.
Subclause
13(7) provides for the Executive Director to
prescribe the manner in which the delegate may
exercise the delegated powers, and specify in
detail particular requirements of a delegation
as he or she sees necessary. This will be
particularly important where it is considered by
the Executive Director as necessary to delegate
powers to persons other than staff members. For
the purpose of this provision, directions can be
any direction in any form in addition to any
direction or condition spelt out in the relevant
instrument of delegation. Such directions may
take the form of a verbal or written direction
to an individual or to a group, for example,
directions and policy contained within an ATSB
policy and procedures manual.
Subclause
13(8) clarifies that where the Executive
Directors power under a particular provision of
the Bill has been delegated, any reference to
the Executive Director in that provision means
the delegate as well as the Executive Director.
Clause
14 Special investigators
This
clause allows the Executive Director to appoint
a special investigator to exercise powers
under Clause 32, in addition to all other
powers, which the Executive Director may
delegate to any suitably qualified person. A special
investigator could be a State/Territory
official, a private expert or other private
person provided he or she meets the criteria set
out in the regulations regarding qualifications
and experience required for such an appointment.
In addition, a special investigator could
be a person appointed to an investigation under
this Bill in accordance with international
obligations. The reasons for the need to appoint
private citizens as delegates to exercise
coercive powers are set out in the comments at
Subclause 13(1) in this Memorandum.
Clause
15 Independence
This
clause provides that neither the Minister nor
the Secretary may direct the Executive Director
in relation to the manner in which the Executive
Director exercises his or her powers under this
Bill except in respect of a direction by the
Minister under paragraph 21(1)(b). The independence
of the Executive Director is consistent with
Australias international obligation to conduct independent
investigations into transport safety
occurrences. For example, Paragraph 5.4 of Annex
13 to the International Convention on Civil
Aviation provides that the accident
investigation authority shall have independence
in the conduct of the investigation and have
unrestricted authority over its conduct. The
Secretary or Minister cannot direct the
Executive Director to not investigate a
particular transport safety matter, nor can they
direct which staff members are selected to
conduct an investigation into a particular
transport safety matter. In addition, neither
the Secretary nor the Minister can influence the
content of any information that is released by
the Executive Director in the interests of
transport safety. Note that the Executive
Director remains accountable to the Minister and
the Parliament. Also note that the Executive
Director is answerable to the Secretary in
matters related to such legislation as the Public
Service Act 1999 and Financial Management
and Accountability Act 1997.
Clause
16 Minimal disruption to transport services
This
clause explains that the Executive Director is
to be cognisant of the commercial implications
caused by the disruption to transport services
following a transport accident. In order to
ensure, to the extent practicable, that the
safety investigation process itself does not
result in delays to transport services, the
Executive Director will adopt procedures that
enable him/her to carry out investigative
functions and duties efficiently. This clause is
primarily concerned with cases where, following
an occurrence, the transport vehicle is not able
to be moved under its own power and where the
location of the accident site is such that the
transport vehicle, its wreckage and the area
secured by the Executive Director for the
purpose of examination of the vehicle and its
wreckage, may temporarily prevent other
transport services from operating or may delay
those services. For example, a derailment on an
interstate rail line, the crash of an aircraft
on the main runway at Sydney or the disabling of
a ship in a main shipping channel. In practice,
the safety investigation process is often
carried out at the same time as first response
and recovery operations are in progress and
where those activities in themselves preclude
the operation of normal services for safety
reasons. In some cases, where the accident site
is large and complex, it must be acknowledged
that the on-site investigation process will
necessarily take longer. In the interests of
transport safety, the Executive Director may be
required to delay services on those rare but
critical occasions. Refer also to Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Clause 39 Power to
Stop and Detain a Vehicle.
Note
that for the purposes of this clause, transport
relates to transport by means of aircraft, ships
and rail vehicles.
Clause
17 International obligations
This
clause requires the Executive Director to
exercise his or her powers in a manner
consistent with Australias obligations under
relevant international agreements that are
identified by the regulations. It is intended
that the applicable international agreements
will include for aviation, Annex 13 to the
Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation and for marine, Article 94(7) of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, IMO Resolution
A.849(20), SOLAS & MARPOL. Note that there
is no equivalent international agreement for
rail.
Part
3 Compulsory reporting of accidents etc.
Clause
18 Immediate reports
This
clause creates an obligation on a responsible
person to report an immediately
reportable matter as soon as possible and by
means prescribed by the regulations. It is
intended that the regulations will state the
preferred means of reporting, eg. by telephone.
The reason for such a requirement is that the
need for the Executive Director to act as
quickly as possible to preserve evidence and to
determine the proximal and underlying factors
that led to an accident or serious incident is
often paramount for optimum safety outcomes.
The
regulations will prescribe immediately
reportable matters and provide a list of responsible
persons for each transport mode. Responsible
persons for the purposes of reporting will
include only those with an operational
connection to the transport vehicle such as the
crew, the owner and/or operator of the transport
vehicle or persons performing vehicle control
duties, for example, air traffic controllers or
train controllers. The principles of this
provision and the penalties applying to the
failure to report transport safety matters are
derived from the existing aviation legislation.
First response agencies such as the police are
not to be included in the list of responsible
persons required to report safety
occurrences. However, in practice, such agencies
may indeed be the first to provide notification
of some transport accidents to the ATSB though
there would be no attendant penalty if they did
not do so.
The
penalty associated with the failure to report immediately
reportable matters is intended to ensure
that responsible persons who may wish to
deliberately conceal the fact that an accident
or serious incident has occurred, perhaps
motivated by insurance implications or employer
disciplinary sanctions, will be discouraged from
doing so. Consequently, timely reporting will
enable the Executive Director to act quickly for
reasons previously outlined in this Clause.
Note
that a report under Clause 18 must be followed
by a written report under Clause 19. It is also
recognised that there may be a number of responsible
persons who are aware of a particular immediately
reportable matter. The ATSB has no
objections to multiple reports being received as
a result of the obligation imposed on those responsible
persons. The important issue is that the
ATSB is made aware of the immediately
reportable matter in a timely fashion so
that appropriate action can be taken to commence
an investigation. However, it is acknowledged
that it would be impractical to expect each and
every responsible person who is aware of
an immediately reportable matter to
report and to impose a large criminal penalty if
they do not. Therefore, if the responsible
person has reasonable grounds to believe
that the immediately reportable matter
has already been reported by another responsible
person, then they are no longer under that
obligation. It is recommended that if the responsible
person is in doubt, then he or she should
report the matter anyway.
Subclause
18(3) explains that matters that are required to
be reported under provisions of the Navigation
Act 1912 or the Protection of the Sea
(Protection of Pollution from Ships) Act 1983 will
satisfy the reporting requirements under this
Bill where they are reportable matters under
this Bill. The policy intent is to nominate
Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
officers as nominated officials under the
provisions of Clause 19. AMSA officers, in turn,
will be expected to report such matters to the
Executive Director.
Clause
19 Written reports within 72 hours
This
clause requires a responsible person to provide
a written report on a reportable matter (which
may be an immediately reportable matter
or a routine reportable matter) within 72
hours. The change from 48 hours (as referred to
in current aviation legislation) to 72 hours was
to ensure compatibility with similar reporting
requirements under State/Territory legislation,
in particular, requirements as they currently
relate to rail safety occurrences. The
regulations will prescribe routine reportable
matters. Note that this requirement is in
addition to the reporting requirement under
Clause 18 in relation to immediately
reportable matters. Note also that the same
principles apply as referred to in the
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause 18,
regarding responsible persons being
relieved of the obligation to provide a written
report if they have reasonable grounds to
believe that another responsible person
has already done so.
Subclause
19(3) Refer to Explanatory Memorandum comments
at Subclause 18(3).
Clause
20 Nominated officials for receiving reports
This
clause allows the Executive Director to provide
a list, in the regulations, of officials who
have the function of receiving reports under
Clause 18 or Clause 19. In some cases, it is
considered appropriate for organisations or
persons other than the Executive Director to be
the main conduit for such reports. For example,
in the case of marine occurrences, it is
unreasonable for foreign ship Masters to
differentiate between the Australian Maritime
Safety Authority (AMSA) and the Australian
Transport Safety Bureau, and as AMSA (through
AusSAR) is often the first point of contact, a
report is made to AMSA. It is expected that AMSA
will, in turn, report to the ATSB, rather than
the owners and operators involved in the
reportable matter reporting directly to the
ATSB.
Part
4 Investigations and reports
Division
1 - Investigations
Clause
21 Investigations
Subclause
21(1) and Subclause 21(2) provide that the
Executive Director has discretionary power to
investigate any investigable matter except with
respect to a direction to investigate in respect
of paragraph 21(1)(b). The Executive Director
may also discontinue or scale down any
particular investigation in cases where it is
clear that there is little safety value in
continuing the investigation and available
resources are better directed elsewhere. Note
that this Bill does not preclude the Executive
Director from re-opening an investigation if the
Executive Director becomes aware of significant
new information.
Paragraph
21(1)(b) places a limit on the Executive
Directors discretionary power to investigate by
requiring the Executive Director to investigate
a transport safety matter upon a direction from
the Minister. This paragraph must be read in
conjunction with Clause 15 Independence.
It must be noted that while the Minister
can, upon written direction, require the
Executive Director to commence an investigation
into a particular transport safety matter, the
Minister cannot place any restrictions on the
manner in which the investigation is conducted.
Subclause
21(3) requires a statement to be released within
28 days of discontinuing an investigation,
explaining the reasons why the Executive
Director has elected not to continue to
investigate a particular investigable matter.
Clause
22 Restriction on investigations of transport
safety matters
This
clause describes circumstances in which a
transport safety matter may or may not be
investigated under the Bill. The restrictions
provided under Clause 22 are imposed on policy
grounds and are additional to the constitutional
limits imposed under Clause 11. Note that a
reference to Australia in this clause should be
interpreted in accordance with Section 15B of
the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, which
defines Australia to include the coastal sea
(including the territorial sea).
Subclause
22(1) provides that a transport safety matter is
not investigable unless it has a link to
Australia, for example, the occurrence occurs in
Australia, involves an Australian transport
vehicle outside Australia, there is evidence
relating to the occurrence found within
Australia, or where a foreign country requests
the Executive Director to investigate.
An
example in relation to paragraph 22(1)(c) is
where a foreign registered ship en route from
New Zealand to Australia may be involved in an
occurrence outside Australia. The Executive
Director will have the power to investigate by
virtue of the fact that the ship arrives and
docks at an Australian port and there is now
evidence in Australia (on board the ship) for
the purposes of a safety investigation such as
the crew, ships documents and ship components.
A
further example, though in aviation, is where a
foreign registered aircraft is involved in a
near collision within the Australian Flight
Information Region while it is en route to
Singapore. The Executive Director will have the
power to investigate by virtue of the fact that
evidence exists within Australia such as the Air
Traffic Control tapes and records. If the crew
that was involved in the occurrence later
returned to Australia, the Executive Director
would be able to exercise powers under the Bill
in order to, for example, interview the crew. It
must be noted that in such cases, aspects of the
investigation conducted outside Australia in
such situations may be subject to the laws of
the relevant country.
Paragraph
22(1)(d) relates to an occurrence or situation
that normally falls outside the policy
boundaries of this legislation such as the
sinking of a foreign ship or crash of a foreign
aircraft in international waters off the
Australian coast. In such cases the Executive
Director will have the power to investigate if
the country that would normally be responsible
for conducting such an investigation, requests
the Executive Director to do so. This element of
Clause 22 enables Australia to meet its
international obligations in respect of marine
and aviation safety investigations.
Subclause
22(2) excludes from the application of the Bill
occurrences involving ONLY exempt transport
vehicles (ie. Australian defence aircraft or
ships, or aircraft and ships operated by the
military, customs or police of a foreign
country).However, the Executive Director may
investigate a matter normally outside the
application of the Bill at the request of the
Australian Defence Force (see Subclause 22(3)).
Note that the Executive Director may investigate
an occurrence involving BOTH an exempt
transport vehicle and a transport vehicle
that is not an exempt transport vehicle
and/or a civil transportation facility.
In such cases, the Executive Director has broad
and coercive powers to obtain evidential
material in relation to the exempt
transport vehicle, including systems and
facilities that support the safe operation of
that vehicle.
Note
that a civil transportation facility may
include, but is not limited to, installations
such as Air Traffic Control centres and
facilities used to support the maintenance of
transport vehicles or logistics of transport
vehicle operations. This would include even
those facilities that may, in some cases, also
support the safe operation or maintenance of exempt
transport vehicles.
Subclause
22(3) clarifies that the Executive Director may
investigate an occurrence involving defence
vehicles at the request of the Australian
Defence Force. It also places a requirement on
the Executive Director to publish details of any
request by the Australian Defence Force.
Publishing details of the request provides a
mechanism to advise those persons who may become
subject to the powers and obligations under this
Bill as a result of the request, who would not
otherwise have become subject. For example,
military personnel involved in the occurrence
that the Executive Director has been asked to
investigate. Note that the term publish means to
make public or generally known and is not
confined to any particular means. In practice,
the ATSB would liaise directly with relevant
personnel in the Australian Defence Force and
would, as a minimum, place details of the
request on the ATSB website (or similar).
Clause
23 Transport safety matters
This
clause defines transport safety matter
for the purposes of the Bill. In order to keep
the list of investigable transport safety
matters generic, and avoid using mode-specific
terminology, a broad menu of general event or
situational descriptions has been listed. This
menu must be considered in conjunction with
Clause 11, which describes the constitutional
boundaries of investigating under this Bill.
Decisions about which particular transport
safety matters will be investigated and to what
level under this Bill, will be determined at a
policy level, as consistent with Government
policy. For example, when prioritising matters
to be investigated, the Executive Director may
have regard to the Government policy, which
requires that the primary consideration be the
safety of fare-paying
passengers.
Note
that this clause covers events where no damage
to any property or injury to any person has in
fact taken place but where something occurred
that affected, is affecting or could affect
transport safety. For example, the loading of
contaminated fuel, the breakdown of rail or air
traffic control services, incorrect loading of a
transport vehicle having a significant effect on
the vehicles mass and balance, incorrect
transmission, receipt or interpretation of
significant messages or a significant change to
air or sea port operations resulting in vehicle
operations for which the port was not designed.
All of the previous examples may have the
potential to adversely affect the safety of
transport systems.
Note
also that an investigation maybe triggered by a
series of occurrences that reveal an adverse
safety trend for the particular transport mode
or transport safety more generally. In addition,
the occurrence does not need to involve any
particular transport vehicle but may affect, or
have the potential to affect, any number of
transport vehicles.
Clause
24 Offence to hinder etc. an investigation
Subclause
24(1) sets out the elements of the offence of
hindering an investigation, namely a person must
be reckless as to any possible adverse impacts
of his or her conduct, and that the conduct must
have the result of adversely affecting an
investigation, and the conduct is not authorised
by the Executive Director. Note that in
accordance with guidance in the Criminal Code,
where recklessness is a fault element of a
physical element of an offence, proof of
intention, knowledge or recklessness will
satisfy the fault element.
This
provision is intended to cover conduct such as
withholding information, concealing evidence,
tampering with evidence etc but no conduct will
constitute an offence unless it actually has an
adverse effect on an investigation. This clause
not only relates to accident sites where it is
very important that evidence is preserved, but
also extends to include such things as the
destruction/removal of evidence remote from the
accident site such as minutes of meetings,
training records, data recordings etc. Such
information may provide crucial evidence
pertinent to the investigation. Where an
immediately reportable matter has occurred, the
offence may apply before the matter is reported
and before Executive Director decides to
investigate. This is because a person would
reasonably be expected to know that the
Executive Director is likely to investigate in
such cases. Therefore, this provision serves to
discourage persons from tampering with evidence
before the matter is reported to the Executive
Director and an investigation can be commenced.
Without such a provision, it would be possible
for persons to tamper with evidence relating to
a serious safety occurrence before reporting to
the Executive Director in the knowledge that
they cannot be prosecuted for doing so with the
real potential for critical safety information
to be lost or destroyed. In all other cases, ie.
where the transport safety matter is not
immediately reportable, the offence will apply
only if the conduct took place at the time that
the Executive Director was conducting an
investigation. In such cases, where the
transport safety matter is of a less serious
nature, it would not reasonably be expected that
a person would know that an investigation is
likely to be conducted.
Note
that this offence is broader than Clause 149.1
of the Criminal Code (Obstructing
Commonwealth Public Officials) as it covers
conduct that is not directed at a particular
official but rather hindering an investigation
or future investigation more generally.
This
offence is not generally intended to put
restrictions on agencies with legitimate rights
to investigate. Those agencies, in accordance
with Clause 10 of this Bill, may investigate in
parallel if necessary to an investigation being
conducted by the Executive Director. Those
agencies would not ordinarily be considered to
be hindering an ATSB investigation and thus be
subject to the attendant penalties unless the
actions of officers from those agencies were
clearly reckless and adversely affected an
investigation under this Bill. In practice, the
Executive Director will coordinate and cooperate
with other agencies, consistent with the objects
clause of this Bill, and would reasonably expect
cooperation from those agencies. It is intended
that working protocols between the Executive
Director and other relevant agencies such as
transport regulatory authorities, police,
OH&S authorities and coroners will be dealt
with in Memoranda of Understanding. These
protocols may, for example, provide that the
Executive Director will authorise certain
conduct for purposes of paragraph 24(1)(d). Note
also that State or Territory governments cannot
be prosecuted for an offence under the Bill.
This
provision and others, ensures that the Executive
Director has an unhampered ability to conduct a
safety investigation and is consistent with the
principles of international agreements.
Subclause
24(2) provides exceptions to the offence under
Subclause 24(1) in addition to the standard
defences under Part 2.3 of the Criminal Code
such as a sudden and extraordinary emergency.
These additional exceptions include conduct
ensuring the safety of persons, animals, or
property, the removal of deceased persons or
animals, making safe vehicles and wreckage, and
conduct to protect the environment from
significant damage or pollution. This will
allow, for instance, first response agencies to
ensure the safety of persons, animals and
property; coroners to remove bodies from the
wreckage of a transport vehicle for the purposes
of a coronial inquiry; and agencies such as the
Australian Maritime Safety Authority to deal
with the damaging effects of pollution without
the need for authorisation by the Executive
Director.
Subclause
24(3) makes it clear that the offence in
Subclause 24(1) does not apply in cases where a
person may have initially given consent to the
Executive Director to enter premises in
accordance with Clause 34 and subsequently
withdrawn that consent or has chosen not to
provide assistance to the Executive Director as
a result of the withdrawal of consent. In such
cases, the Executive Director would be required
to consider the need to obtain a warrant except
if the premises were special premises where
entry is permitted without consent or warrant.
(For further explanation on entry to premises,
refer to Explanatory Memorandum comments at
Clauses 33, 34 and 35).
Subclause
24(4) clarifies that, in the spirit of
cooperation, the Bill is not intended to
unnecessarily impede the statutory activities of
other Commonwealth, State and Territory
agencies. Therefore the Executive Director will
not unreasonably withhold authorisation under
paragraph 24(1)(d).
Subclause
24(5) clarifies that conduct may include an
omission. For example, an Air Traffic Services
officer not retrieving/isolating air traffic
control information when it would be reasonably
expected that the officer should have known that
such an action was necessary in the
circumstances.
Division
2 Investigation reports
Clause
25 Reports on investigations
Subclause
25(1) provides for the publication of
investigation reports by the Executive Director
for the purposes of transport safety. Subclause
25(2) allows the Executive Director to release
such things as preliminary reports, interim
factual reports, safety recommendations etc
either as an internal policy or in accordance
with an international agreement, whether or not
the investigation has been completed. The
release of investigation reports is considered
vital to ensure that the public and the
transport industry are aware of the safety
issues and to confirm that the investigation
process has been open and independent.
That process, in turn, allows an opportunity for
the transport industry, including operators,
manufacturers, regulators etc., to take
appropriate safety action to reduce or eliminate
the risk of similar safety occurrences in the
future.
Subclause
25(3) clarifies that a report may include
submissions made to the Executive Director
either in response to a draft report released
under Clause 26 or to safety recommendations.
For example, the Executive Director may wish to
include, as part of the public record, comments
made by directly involved parties to the
investigation in relation to the accuracy of the
factual information in a draft report in
accordance with Subclause 26(1). Similarly, the
Executive Director may also wish to include
responses to safety recommendations that were
issued to organisations or individuals. Those
responses would normally indicate whether the
organisation or individual accepted the safety
recommendations and what action, if any, is to
be taken to address the safety issues identified
during the investigation. Advice received from
organisations on safety action taken or proposed
in response to the findings of an investigation
of a transport safety matter may also be
included in a published report in the form of a safety
action statement.
Subclause
25(4) clarifies that, without consent, a person
will not be referred to by name in a report. In
order to meet the no blame principle of the Bill
and to comply with international obligations,
long standing practice has been not to name any
person in a report that has been directly or
indirectly an object of the investigation.
Notwithstanding, this clause may accommodate
future policy changes with respect to naming
other persons in an investigation report such as
the investigator in charge, the author of the
report, the current Executive Director or the
Minister who may have directed that a particular
transport safety matter be investigated under
paragraph 21(1)(b). In such cases, the consent
of those persons would be required.
Subclause
25(5) clarifies that a report may include any
safety action statements and safety
recommendations issued by the Executive Director
either as part of the final report or those
issued separately from the final report.
Note
that this Bill continues to refer to safety
recommendations in conformity with ICAO Annex 13
terminology. However, it is believed that safety
action undertaken or in progress (in the form of
safety action statements) should be
reported in preference to making safety
recommendations as this has the potential to
result in better safety outcomes such as early
implementation of safety measures and reflects
well on organisations that take timely safety
action. Where this is not possible, safety
recommendations will normally be couched in
broad terms in language that is sufficient to
clearly address the desired safety outcome and
not to provide prescriptive solutions. Safety
solutions are usually best left to regulators
and other organisations with the technical
knowledge and ability to make appropriate
risk-based, cost effective safety changes within
their sphere of influence.
Clause
26 Draft reports
Subclause
26(1) permits the Executive Director to provide
draft reports on a confidential basis to
appropriate persons for the purpose of allowing
those persons to make submissions. The primary
purpose of this subclause is to improve the
accuracy of the contents of the report by
allowing directly involved parties to view and
comment on the draft report. Directly involved
parties are those individuals or organisations
that may have influenced the circumstances that
led to a transport safety occurrence. It may
include individuals and organisations remote in
time and place to the occurrence but whose
decisions and actions had an impact on the
nature of the operating environment of the
transport vehicle and, in turn, the decisions
and actions of the operating crew. For example,
the owner of the transport vehicle, the
organisation that manufactured the transport
vehicle, the transport safety regulator
responsible for the rules under which the
transport vehicle operates or the organisation
that employs and trains the operating crew of
the transport vehicle. This process is
consistent with international agreements
relating to aviation and marine investigation,
to which Australia is a party.
Depending
on the circumstances of a particular occurrence,
directly involved parties could include some or
all of the following, for example, in aviation:
some
or all of the surviving crew members of
an aircraft;
the
aircraft operator;
the
aviation regulatory authority;
the
manufacturer of the aircraft;
the
air traffic control service provider;
the
aircraft component manufacturer;
the
aircraft maintainer;
the
aerodrome/airport operator; and
another
person or organisation whose reputation may be
affected following the public release of the
report.
Equivalent
parties in other modes may be considered by the
Executive Director to be directly involved
parties for the purposes of this subclause.
This
subclause also permits the Executive Director to
provide advance notice of the broad form of the
published report to directly involved parties.
This may, in turn, allow those parties to
prepare themselves for any possible
repercussions, such as media attention,
following the public release of the final
report.
Subclause
26(2) makes it an offence for a person who
receives a draft report under Subclauses 26(1)
or 26(4) to copy or disclose the contents to any
other person or to a court. A draft report may
be subject to change before its release to the
public and is issued to directly involved
parties for the reason described. It is vital
that there is an obligation on those individuals
who are issued with or have a copy of the draft
report under paragraphs 26(1)(a) or (b) or
26(4)(a) or (b), to not further disclose that
information or provide it to a court. This is to
prevent the information, for example, from being
taken out of context or misused and, as a
result, prejudicing that particular
investigation or future investigations, or
unnecessarily and unjustly tarnishing
reputations.
Subclause
26(3) provides that the offence under Subclause
26(2) does not require any proof of intention,
knowledge, recklessness or negligence with
respect to the fact that the draft report has
been provided under Subclause 26(1) or (4).
However, a person is not criminally responsible
for the offence if at or before the time of the
offending conduct the person considered whether
or not the draft report had been provided under
Subclause 26(1) or (4), and was under a mistaken
but reasonable belief that the report was not
provided to him or her under either one of those
provisions (see section 9.2 of the Criminal
Code regarding mistake of fact (strict
liability)).
Subclause
26(4) clarifies that Subclause 26(2) does not
prevent copying or disclosure that is necessary
for preparing submissions on the draft report or
for taking remedial action in relation to
identified safety deficiencies. In respect of
making submissions to a draft report, it may be
necessary for several persons within an
organisation to view the draft report in order
to assist with that process. The latter reason
is an acknowledgment of the importance of taking
timely remedial safety action, whether or not an
investigation has been completed.
Subclause
26(5) clarifies that a court cannot compel a
person to provide a draft report to the court.
This subclause differs from previous references
in Clause 26 about disclosure to courts as those
references relate to voluntary disclosure.
Subclause
26(6) provides that no disciplinary action may
be taken against an employee or a person on the
basis of information in the draft report
acquired under Subclause 26(1) or (4). As draft
reports may be subject to change before the
release of the final report, it may be premature
to take disciplinary action against an employee
when the contents of the final report suggest
that disciplinary action may not have been
warranted.
Subclause
26(7) clarifies that, without consent, a person
will not be referred to by name in a draft
report. For further explanation, refer to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Subclause
25(4).
Clause
27 Reports not admissible in evidence
Subclause
27(1) makes investigation reports inadmissible
in evidence in civil or criminal proceedings
whether through inadvertent disclosure or in
contravention of this part of the Bill. This
subclause sends a clear message that such
information is to be used for the purpose of
safety only and should not to be used in the
judicial system for the purpose of blame or
liability, otherwise it could prejudice the free
flow of safety information in future transport
safety investigations.
Subclause
27(2) excepts coronial inquiries from the
provisions in Subclause 27(1). This acknowledges
that coronial inquiries share a similar purpose
to investigations conducted under this Bill.
Subclause
27(3) precludes admission of draft reports in
civil (including coronial) and criminal
proceedings. A draft report may be subject to
change as a result of further investigation and
the interested party process. Therefore, it
would not be in the best interest of the legal
system or the individuals and organisations
affected by the analysis and conclusions of the
investigation, for the ATSB to provide such a
report for use in any court proceedings,
including coronial proceedings. The risk of
incorrect conclusions being drawn from the
information contained in a draft report could be
significant and the repercussions unnecessary
and damaging. Refer also to Explanatory
Memorandum comment at Subclause 27(1).
Part
5 Investigation powers
Division
1 - Preliminary
Clause
28 Powers only exercisable in relation to an
investigation
This
clause clarifies that the powers provided in
Part 5 are confined to an investigation under
this Bill. In clarifying this matter, this
clause acknowledges that the Bill provides for
wide and coercive powers that may infringe upon
the rights of individuals. Therefore, those
powers must not be exercised except in relation
to an investigation conducted for the ultimate
purpose of enhancing transport safety.
Clause
29 Identity cards
Subclause
29(1) imposes an obligation on the Executive
Director to ensure that identity cards are
issued to persons exercising premises powers.
Premises powers are defined in Clause 3. Such an
obligation is considered reasonable and is
consistent with requirements in other statutes,
which also provide for premises powers. Persons
affected by the powers in this subclause need to
be assured that the person exercising those
powers has a legal right to do so.
Subclause
29(2) makes it mandatory for an identity card to
have a photograph and be in a form prescribed by
regulations. A photograph will clearly indicate
to the affected parties that the delegations to
exercise those powers have been conferred on the
person shown on the identity card and enable the
affected parties to verify that the person
carrying the identity card is bona fide.
Subclause
29(3) creates an offence if a person issued with
an identity card does not return the card to the
Executive Director when the person ceases to be
entitled to a card. This subclause therefore
acknowledges that the coercive powers conferred
on the wearer of an identity card must not be
misused. This would prevent, for example, a
person continuing to exert the powers associated
with the card to gain access to premises even
though that person no longer has the delegation
to exert those powers.
Subclause
29(4) means the offence under Subclause 29(3)
requires no proof of fault element such as
intent or knowledge.
Subclause
29(5) qualifies Subclause 29(4) by making a
person not guilty of the offence if the identity
card was lost or stolen. Note that if a lost
card was subsequently used by another person,
that person may be guilty of an offence under
the Criminal Code such as impersonation
of a Commonwealth public official, and may be
subject to legal action for engaging in certain
conduct without proper legal authority (such as
trespass).
Subclause
29(6) requires the holder of an identity card to
carry it when exercising premises powers. For
example, if four ATSB investigators wished to
gain access to premises at the same time, each
of the four investigators who are exercising the
premises powers must have an identity card
displayed, not simply the first investigator of
the four to gain access to the premises.
However, an identity card is not required by a
person who is merely assisting an investigator
to gain entry to premises, where such assistance
is required and who is not otherwise exercising
premises powers under this Bill.
Clause
30 Production of identity card
This
clause removes the ability of the Executive
Director to exercise investigation powers under
Part 5 if an occupier requires the production of
his identity card and the Executive Director (or
delegate) fails to comply.
Clause
31 Powers conferred on magistrates
Subclause
31(1) clarifies that the powers conferred on a
magistrate by Part 5, are personal powers and
not powers of a court. Since the powers under
Part 5 (ie. powers relating to search warrants)
are administrative and not judicial powers, this
provision is consistent with the notion of the
separation of powers of the Judiciary and the
Executive, and the general assumption that a
non-judicial power is conferred on the
magistrate only in his or her personal capacity.
Subclause
31(2) extends court immunity to magistrates
exercising powers under Part 5. For example, an
action against a magistrate in the ACT in
relation to his or her issue of a search warrant
under Part 5 will not be successful unless the
person who brought the action can prove the
magistrate was acting with malice and without
reasonable and probable cause (see Section 241
of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT)).
Subclause
31(3) makes it clear that a magistrate of a
particular State or Territory may issue search
warrants in respect of premises in another State
or Territory. For example, it may be more
practical and expeditious to issue a warrant in
the ACT (most investigators are based in
Canberra) before an investigator departs to the
location where the warrant is to be executed,
say, the north-west of Western Australia. In
such cases, it may be logistically difficult to
obtain a warrant from a magistrate in Western
Australia when it is considered necessary to act
quickly to preserve/collect evidence.
Division
2 Requirement to attend before the Executive
Director
Clause
32 Executive Director may require persons to
attend and answer questions etc.
Subclause
32(1) enables the Executive Director to require
the attendance of a person for the purpose of an
investigation and to require production of
specified evidential material. This
mechanism ensures that the Executive Director
has the ability to obtain ALL the information he
or she considers is relevant to a safety
investigation, particularly in cases where the
person does not wish to be cooperative. Note
that this requirement may at times be
time-critical due to the possibility that evidential
material may be perishable or may become
inaccessible. In addition, the need to require a
person to provide information to the Executive
Director may also be essential in the interests
of safety as that person may be aware of
critical safety information that has the
potential to prevent similar events from
occurring. There is no explicit provision for
either legal counsel or any other person to
accompany the person attending before the
Executive Director. However, as a matter of
policy, the Executive Director will allow a
person to be accompanied by whomsoever they
wish, though that person or persons will be
asked to observe only and not to actively
participate in the interview. Note that where
the Executive Director considers that the person
accompanying the person attending before him/her
is engaging in conduct that is adversely
affecting the investigation, that person may be
subject to penalties in respect of Clause 24 Offence
to hinder etc. an investigation.
Also
note that when a person is attending before the
Executive Director or his or her delegate under
this subclause, that person is required to
answer questions put by any person the Executive
Director allows (not just the Executive Director
or delegates) relating to matters relevant to
the investigation.
Subclause
32(2) clarifies that a coroner, acting in his
capacity as a coroner, cannot be compelled by
the Executive Director to answer questions or to
provide evidential material. However,
this subclause does not prevent the Executive
Director requiring a coroner who, for example,
may have been an eye witness to a transport
accident, to answer questions etc. as a private
citizen. In addition, this subclause does not
prevent a person assisting the coroner such as
police officer being required by the Executive
Director to attend and answer questions etc.
Subclause
32(3) provides that the Executive Director may
only exercise his or her power under Subclause
32(1) by issuing a written notice. This
subclause also outlines notice requirements when
attendance of a person is required for an
investigation or when specified evidential
material is required. Note that the notice
must be directed to an individual and not an
organisation.
Subclause
32(4) provides that the Executive Director, when
a person is required for an investigation, has
the discretion to require answers on oath or by
affirmation and that he or she may administer
oaths or affirmations to a person. While this is
not a common practice, there may be some
occasions in relation to critical safety
matters, when the Executive Director considers
it necessary in order to satisfy himself or
herself that the person has been truthful and
forthcoming in the provision of information.
Subclause
32(5) makes it an offence to fail to attend or
produce evidential material as required
under Subclause 32(1), or to refuse to take
oaths or make affirmations or answer questions.
Note that this clause should be read in
conjunction with Clause 47 which describes the
relevant protection to a person from criminal
and civil proceedings, in the event that they
incriminate themselves whilst complying with
Clause 32. Therefore, a person is not excused
from attending and answering questions
truthfully and providing evidential material
on the grounds that the answer to those
questions or the production of that evidentiary
material may incriminate themselves or make
themselves liable to a penalty. This
acknowledges the importance of the primary need
to identify the safety issues that may
potentially save lives overriding the right of
an individual to exercise their right to claim
self-incrimination privilege or penalty
privilege.
Subclause
32(6) provides that the offence under Subclause
(5) does not require any proof of intention,
knowledge, recklessness or negligence with
respect to the fact that the requirement to
answer questions or provide evidential
material has been given in accordance with
clause 31. However, a person is not criminally
responsible for the offence if at or before the
time of the offending conduct the person
considered whether or not the requirement was
given in accordance with Clause 32, and is under
a mistaken but reasonable belief that the
requirement was not given in accordance with
Clause 32 (see Section 9.2 of the Criminal
Code regarding mistake of fact (strict
liability)).
Subclause
32(7) provides an entitlement to payment of
fees, allowances and expenses in accordance with
the regulations, for persons who attend before
the Executive Director under Subclause 32(1). In
practice in most cases, the Executive Director
travels to a mutually agreed location so that
the person is subject to minimal inconvenience.
Division
3 Powers in relation to premises
Clause
33 Power to enter special premises without
consent or warrant
This
clause enables the Executive Director to enter special
premises without a warrant or consent and to
use reasonable force where necessary. Special
premises is defined under Clause 3 to
include premises such as a transport vehicle or
an accident site. In practice, this clause
allows an investigator to gain access to
accident sites in order to preserve and collect,
as soon as possible, potentially vital evidence
relevant to an investigation. As there is
usually considerable evidence on an accident
site that is perishable, it may be impracticable
or impossible to get a warrant in time, and so
it is imperative to gain access to the site in a
timely fashion without having to obtain a
warrant first. It may also be impractical to
gain consent to enter an accident site as this
may unduly delay the commencement of the
evidence preservation and collection process.
This power also extends to vehicles, which, by
their transient nature, may also need to be
quickly accessed in case they are removed to a
less accessible location where relevant evidence
may be removed or destroyed simply by virtue of
the vehicle relocating. Vehicles include not
only transport vehicles as defined for
purposes of this Bill, but also other vehicles
such as cars and trucks. The ability to gain
access to vehicles without a warrant is
consistent with similar provisions in other
statutes.
Clause
34 Power to enter any premises with occupiers
consent
Subclause
34(1) enables the Executive Director to enter
any premises with the consent of the occupier.
This is consistent with long-standing ATSB
practice in relation to entry to premises.
However, where the occupier has provided consent
to enter premises, then subsequently withdraws
consent to cooperate further with the Executive
Director, the Executive Director may have to
consider the need to exercise his/her powers
under the provisions of a warrant.
Subclause
34(2) makes it mandatory to inform persons that
they may refuse consent for entry to premises
under Subclause 34(1), when the Executive
Director is obtaining consent. If the occupier
refuses consent, the Executive Director may
consider the need to gain access to the premises
under the provisions of a warrant (refer to
Clauses 40, 41 and 42), except in relation to special
premises, where the Executive Director may
enter without consent or warrant.
Subclause
34(3) requires consent to be voluntary. A person
must be completely willing and not goaded/forced
into consenting.
Clause
35 Power to enter any premises with warrant
Subclause
35(1) empowers the Executive Director to enter
any premises under an investigation warrant.
This is standard protocol, which is consistent
with Commonwealth legal policy. This provision
will apply, where necessary, to premises other
than special premises.
Subclause
35(2) outlines formal requirements that the
Executive Director must comply with before
entering premises under an investigation
warrant. These require announcement of authority
and giving an opportunity to any person at the
premises to allow entry.
Subclause
35(3) excuses the Executive Director from the
requirements of Subclause 35(2) if he or she
believes it is necessary to ensure the safety of
a person or effective execution of the warrant.
For example, if the investigator observes that
someones life is in danger inside the premises,
they may consider it necessary to enter the
premises quickly to render or seek assistance.
This provision is consistent with warrant
provisions in other statutes. It may also be the
case, for example, that the occupier is trying
to stop or delay the Executive Director from
entering the premises in order to prevent evidential
material from being collected or to allow
time to hide or destroy evidential material.
In such cases, it may be considered sufficiently
important to prevent such actions by entering
the premises quickly without complying with
Subclause 35(2).
Subclause
35(4) imposes a requirement on the Executive
Director to provide to the occupier a copy of
the warrant or a copy of the form of a warrant
(eg. a proforma warrant may be all the Executive
Director could give to the occupier if the
warrant was obtained by telephone under Clause
41 and therefore a copy of the signed warrant is
not yet available at the time of entry). This
assures the occupier that the warrant is
legitimate and explains clearly the terms of the
warrant. The occupier may also be able to
determine whether the Executive Director goes
beyond the prescribed conditions of the warrant.
Subclause
35(5) allows the Executive Director to use
whatever force and assistance is necessary and
reasonable in the circumstances to execute the
warrant. This provision is consistent with
Commonwealth legal policy with respect to
warrants.
Clause
36 Powers after entering premises
Subclause
36(1) outlines what the Executive Director may
do after entering premises. This includes
searching for, conducting tests on, operating,
retaining samples of, securing and copying evidential
material. This subclause also outlines what
an investigator can do to access or acquire evidential
material. For example, it may be necessary
to operate equipment, other than electronic
equipment, to obtain relevant evidential
material. Note that if experts are required
to operate equipment or obtain evidential
material, the Executive Director may need to
issue appropriate delegations in order for this
to be achieved.
Paragraph
36(1)(g) allows the Executive Director to remove
evidential material from premises with the
consent of the owner where practicable or, where
it is not practicable to obtain the consent of
the owner, the occupier. This provision is
consistent with other Commonwealth statutes that
provide for the removal of evidential material
with consent. There may be many situations when
it will not be easy to identify who is the legal
owner of the material. For example a person may
have been killed in a transport vehicle accident
or has otherwise passed away. Alternatively
there may be a dispute over the ownership of the
thing, for example, aircraft parts and
components are often leased to multiple parties
and under insurance arrangements the title to
the wreckage and parts of a crashed aircraft may
pass to insurers. Similarly when an airline is
subject to insolvency proceedings, there may be
a dispute between a creditor and a person
administering the insolvent firm. In such cases,
it would not be considered practicable to obtain
the consent of the owner and it would therefore
be sufficient to obtain the consent of the
occupier.
Subclause
36(2) makes it clear that before evidential
material may be removed from premises with
the consent of the owner or occupier in
accordance with paragraph 36(1)(g), the
Executive Director must inform the person of the
purpose for which the material is required and
that they may refuse consent. Note that consent
must be voluntary. This is consistent with
long-standing ATSB practice and reflects similar
requirements in other Commonwealth legislative
regimes.
In
cases where the occupier refuses consent, the
Executive Director must consider the need to
seize the evidential material under the
terms of a warrant except if those premises are special
premises where material may be seized
without consent or warrant. Alternatively, the
Executive Director may consider using his or her
powers to require that specified evidential
material be produced to the Executive Director
in accordance with Clause 32.
Subclause
36(3) provides additional powers if the premises
are special premises. These include the
power for the Executive Director to require a
person on the premises to answer questions and
produce evidential material and the power
for the Executive Director to seize evidential
material, without the need for an
investigation warrant. The power of seizure will
allow evidential material to be removed
from the premises for further examination. Special
premises include accident site premises
and vehicles in accordance with Clause 3 Definitions.
In
practice, this subclause applies particularly to
accident sites, where it may be necessary
to obtain information from witnesses while it is
still fresh in their memories and not tainted,
for example, as a result of talking to other
witnesses or simply faded as a factor of time
passing between the event and being interviewed
by the Executive Director. Evidential
material, particularly on accident sites,
could include wreckage, documents etc., all of
which may be perishable, that is, it could be
damaged or changed in some way due to the nature
of the site and the passage of time. Such evidential
material must be collected/recorded
quickly for further examination off-site. This
subclause also acknowledges the transient nature
of vehicles and therefore the possible need to
seize evidential material before it
becomes inaccessible or perished by virtue of
the relocation of the vehicle to another place.
Note
that consistent with Commonwealth legal policy,
the power to seize things without a warrant
under Subclause 36(3) is more limited than the
power of seizure under warrant under Subclause
36(4). The Executive Director may only seize evidential
material under paragraph 36(3)(b) where the
material is directly relevant to the
investigation and where seizure is necessary to
prevent interference with or the concealment,
loss, deterioration or destruction of the
material.
Subclause
36(4) provides additional powers if entry to the
premises is made under an investigation warrant,
for the Executive Director to require a person
on the premises to answer questions and produce evidential
material and for the Executive Director to
seize any evidential material in
accordance with the warrant.
Subclause
36(5) makes it an offence for refusing or
failing to comply with Subclauses 36(3) or
36(4). Such coercive powers are seen as
necessary in the interests of transport safety.
Note that the provision of false or misleading
information in the course of complying (or
purporting to comply) with a requirement under
Subclause 36(3) or 36(4) is a criminal offence
under Clause 137.1 of the Criminal Code.
Subclause
36(6) provides that the offence under Subclause
36(5) does not require any proof of intention,
knowledge, recklessness or negligence with
respect to the fact that the requirement to
answer questions or provide evidential
material etc. has been given under
Subsection 36(3) or 36(4). However, a person is
not criminally responsible for the offence if at
or before the time of the offending conduct the
person considered whether or not the requirement
was given under Subsection 36(3) or 36(4), and
is under a mistaken but reasonable belief that
the requirement was not given under either of
those provisions (see Section 9.2 of the Criminal
Code regarding mistake of fact (strict
liability)).
Clause
37 Occupier to provide Executive Director with
facilities and assistance
This
clause imposes a requirement on occupiers of
premises that are the subject of an
investigation warrant, to render reasonable
facilities and assistance to the Executive
Director exercising his powers. This subclause
is consistent with similar provisions in other
statutes.
Clause
38 Occupier entitled to be present during search
Subclause
38(1) clarifies the extent of an occupier's
entitlement to be present during a search if an
investigation warrant is being executed in
relation to the premises. The provision entitles
the occupier to be present at the premises and
to observe the search.
Subclause
38(2) removes rights to observe a search if the
occupier impedes the search.
Subclause
38(3) clarifies that a right to observe does not
preclude a simultaneous search of two or more
areas of the premises. This subclause is
consistent with similar provisions in other
statutes.
Clause
39 Power to stop and detain transport vehicles
This
clause allows the Executive Director to stop and
detain a transport vehicle for the purposes of
an investigation (Clause 28). However, the
transport vehicle must not be detained for
longer than is necessary and reasonable
(Subclause 39(3)). The use of such a power must
be consistent with the main object of the Bill
(Subclause 7(1)). In addition, the power under
Clause 39 can only be exercised if the Executive
Director considers it is necessary to prevent
the evidential material on the transport vehicle
from being removed from Australia or being
interfered with or to prevent its concealment,
loss, deterioration or destruction. This
provision is primarily intended to capture
circumstances where, following the occurrence of
an investigable transport safety matter, a
transport vehicle is capable of normal or
near-normal operation including, for example,
continuing its journey either to other parts of
Australia or, in particular, overseas. In such
cases, the Executive Director may need to stop
and/or detain the vehicle in order to collect
evidential material. Note that in order to
exercise those powers, the Executive Director
may obtain such assistance and force as is
necessary and reasonable under the
circumstances.
Current
practice suggests that this provision would
rarely be required as, in most cases,
investigation activities that meet the
requirements of the Executive Director are able
to be completed at a time and place mutually
agreed to by the Executive Director and the
operator of the transport vehicle, with little
or no disruption to transport services. Refer
also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at
Clause 16.
Division
4 Investigation warrants
Clause
40 Issue of investigation warrants
Subclause
40(1) provides that the Executive Director may
apply to a magistrate for an investigation
warrant.
Subclause
40(2) clarifies that, before issuing a warrant,
a magistrate must satisfy himself or herself
that there is evidential material on the
premises or there may be within 72 hours.
Subclause
40(3) clarifies that a magistrate may require
further information concerning the grounds for
issuing a warrant and that unless such
information is provided by the Executive
Director or some other person, the warrant must
not be issued.
Subclause
40(4) specifies that the content of a warrant
must authorise entry to the premises, authorise
the exercise of powers set out in Clause 36 and
authorise seizure of evidential material
to which the warrant relates. Paragraph 40(4)(b)
requires the time of entry to be specified.
Paragraph 40(4)(c) requires the warrant to
specify the day on which the warrant ceases to
have effect and paragraph 40(4)(d) requires the
purpose of the warrant to be stated.
Clause
41 Investigation warrants by telephone, fax etc.
Subclause
41(1) provides for the application for a warrant
under Clause 40 to be made by telephone and
electronic means if urgent. This may be
necessary in cases where the Executive Director
considers it necessary to obtain a warrant
quickly and when it may not be practical to do
so in accordance with Clause 40. For example, it
may be necessary for a marine investigator to
board and search a ship on a weekend before the
ship departs for an overseas port. In such
cases, the only practical means of obtaining a
warrant quickly may be in accordance with this
subclause.
Subclause
41(2) provides that a magistrate may require
communication by voice to the extent practicable
in the circumstances. This is to allow the
magistrate to satisfy himself or herself that
there is evidential material on the
premises or there may be within 72 hours and to
clarify any of the conditions of the warrant
being requested by the Executive Director.
Subclause
41(3) requires the Executive Director to prepare
details of the kind specified in Subclause 40(2)
setting out the reasons for and conditions of
the warrant.
Subclause
41(4) clarifies that the Executive Director may,
for example in urgent situations, submit an
application for a warrant first, and then
proceed to swear to declare the truthfulness of
the information provided to the magistrate after
the event. Note, however, that the Executive
Director must provide duly sworn information to
the magistrate no later than the day after the
day of expiry or execution of the warrant in
accordance with Subclause 41(7).
Subclause
41(5) provides for a magistrate to issue a
warrant on consideration of the information and
any further information required if he or she is
satisfied there are reasonable grounds to issue
the warrant.
Paragraph
41(6)(a) makes it obligatory for a magistrate,
upon signing a warrant, to tell the Executive
Director the terms, date and time, duration and
record the reasons.
Paragraph
41(6)(b) makes it obligatory for the Executive
Director to complete a form of warrant as
instructed by the magistrate, and record details
of the magistrate and date.
Subclause
41(7) makes it obligatory for the Executive
Director to return the form of warrant and duly
sworn information to the magistrate not later
than the day after the day of expiry or
execution of the warrant whichever is the
earlier.
Subclause
41(8) makes it obligatory for the magistrate to
attach documents provided under Subclause 41(7)
to the signed warrant and deal with them in the
same way as an application under Clause 40.
Subclause
41(9) clarifies that a form of warrant completed
under paragraph 41(6)(b) has
the same authority as a warrant signed by the
magistrate.
Subclause
41(10) provides that if a warrant signed by a
magistrate authorising the exercise of power is
not produced in evidence in court proceedings
the court must assume, unless the contrary is
proved, that the exercise of the power was not
authorised by the warrant. That is, if the
original document representing the warrant
signed by the magistrate (and not simply the
form of warrant produced by the Executive
Director) is not provided to the court, then the
warrant used by the Executive Director at the
time, is not considered to be legally
authorised.
Clause
42 False statements etc. in application for
warrant etc.
Subclause
42(1) makes it an offence for the Executive
Director to make false or misleading statements,
or statements omitting significant information,
in an application for an investigation warrant.
Subclause
42(2) and Subclause 42(3) provide that the
prohibition under subclause 42(1) does not apply
where the Executive Directors statement is not
false or misleading in relation to a material
aspect, or where the statement did not omit
anything significant.
Subclause
42(4) makes it an offence for the Executive
Director to misuse warrant provisions under
Clause 41, for example, by presenting a document
that purports to be a warrant issued under
Clause 41 where it is not, or contains terms
different from the terms of the warrant issued.
Subclause
42(5) provides that the offence under paragraph
42(4)(a) or (c) does not require any proof of
intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence
with respect to the fact that the document
purports to be a form of warrant under Clause
41. However, the Executive Director is not
criminally responsible for the offence if at or
before the time of the offending conduct he or
she considered whether or not the document
purported to be a warrant under Clause 41, and
is under a mistaken but reasonable belief that
it did not (see Section 9.2 of the Criminal
Code regarding mistake of fact (strict
liability)).
Subclause
42(6)
provides
that the offence under paragraph 42(4)(b) or (d)
does not require any proof of intention,
knowledge, recklessness or negligence with
respect to the fact that the form of warrant is
under Clause 41. However, the Executive Director
is not criminally responsible for the offence if
at or before the time of the offending conduct
he or she considered whether or not the warrant
was under Clause 41, and is under a mistaken but
reasonable belief that it was not (see Section
9.2 of the Criminal Code regarding
mistake of fact (strict liability)).
Division
5 Protection orders
Clause
43 Protection orders by Executive Director
This
clause allows the Executive Director to issue an
order to prevent evidence from being removed or
interfered with. Contravention of such an order
constitutes an offence. This offence differs
from the offence under Clause 24 in that there
is no need to prove actual adverse impact on any
investigation where the Executive Director has
issued a protection order under Subclause 43(1).
This clause is intended to cover situations, in
particular other than at accident sites, where
it might have been usual, despite being related
to a serious safety occurrence (immediately
reportable matter),
to remove or interfere with specified things, or
a specified class of things. For example, there
may have been an immediately reportable
matter in which the crew of an aircraft was
temporarily incapacitated due to suspected fumes
in the aircraft possibly emanating from the
passengers cabin baggage lockers. Following a
normal landing after the event, it may have been
usual practice to allow the passengers to remove
their cabin baggage. However, the Executive
Director may consider it necessary to examine
the passenger cabin baggage in-situ before it is
released to the passengers. In such a case, the
Executive Director would issue a protection
order for the baggage not to be interfered with
until he or she has properly examined it. A
further example to illustrate this clause in
practice is that the cargo load may have shifted
while a ship was en route between ports,
resulting in a loss of ship stability. Although
it might be accepted practice to allow removal
of cargo once the ship arrives in port, the
Executive Director may consider it necessary to
issue an order for the cargo to remain in-situ
until it is properly examined. In practice,
these are not decisions taken lightly and
protection orders would only be issued if the
Executive Director considers it necessary in the
interests of transport safety.
Subclause
43(4) provides exceptions to the offence created
under Subclause 43(1). These are the same
exceptions to the offence created under
Subclause 24(1). For further explanation, refer
also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at
Subclause 24(2).
Subclause
43(5) states that, in the spirit of cooperation,
the Bill is not intended to unnecessarily impede
the statutory activities of other Commonwealth,
State and Territory agencies. Therefore the
Executive Director will not unreasonably
withhold permission under Subclause 43(1)
Division
6 Securing accident sites
Clause
44 Securing accident sites
This
clause enables the Executive Director, by
securing the perimeter of an accident site, to
prevent any person from entering or remaining on
the accident site without the permission of the
Executive Director. The power described in this
clause serves a number of purposes. For example,
it enables better control over the preservation
of evidence and allows the Executive Director to
exercise his or her duty-of -care
responsibilities with regard to occupational
health and safety issues. This provision is not
intended to restrict access by other agencies
with legitimate grounds to investigate, though
such access may necessarily need to be under the
supervision of the Executive Director for the
reasons previously outlined.
Note
that the site may have been previously secured
by another authority, for example, police or the
local firefighting authority. It is expected
that the Executive Director would not formally
control access to the accident site until he or
she arrives on site and the relevant authority
declares that the site is safe to access. Prior
to arrival, the Executive Director may liaise
with local authorities and provide advice
regarding site access, evidence preservation and
safety issues.
Whilst
this provision gives power to the Executive
Director to control access to the site once
rescue and other first response activities have
been completed, the legislation leaves room for
the Executive Director to cooperate with other
agencies and is less coercive in this respect
than some provisions of law enforcement
agencies. Investigators of the ATSB have enjoyed
a good working relationship with first response
and law enforcement agencies over the years.
This legislation does not seek to jeopardise
that relationship but does reiterate that, for
the continued free flow of safety information
and, in turn, the safety of the travelling
public, law enforcement and safety investigation
processes must remain separate to the extent
possible. In essence, the intention is for both
authorities to work cooperatively to achieve
respective objectives.
Subclause
44(3) Provides exceptions to the offence created
under Subclause 44 (1). These are the same
exceptions to the offences created under
Subclauses 24(1) and 43(1). For further
explanation refer also to Explanatory Memorandum
comments at Subclause 24(2).
Subclause
44 (4) states that, in the spirit of
cooperation, the Bill is not intended to
unnecessarily impede the statutory activities of
other Commonwealth, State and Territory
agencies. Therefore the Executive Director will
not unreasonably withhold permission under
paragraph 44(2)(b).
Division
7 Miscellaneous
Clause
45 Retention, testing etc. of evidential
material
This
clause sets out the administrative requirements
for evidential material, and those things
that may be done to material seized for
the purposes of an investigation.
Subclause
45(2) requires that the Executive Director must
provide a receipt for the evidential material
acquired under various provisions in Part 5 of
this Bill. This requirement forms part of the
protocol for the continuity of evidence. The
receipt provides proof of who has possession of
the evidence and in what condition it was in at
the time it was produced, removed with consent
or seized.
Subclause
45(3) provides that the Executive Director may
make copies of evidential material
acquired under Clause 32 or Part 5. It is normal
protocol for the Executive Director to make
copies of documents etc. and not to retain
original material any longer than is necessary.
Note that the Executive Director, being a
non-judicial authority, is not bound by formal
rules of evidence when conducting an
investigation under this Bill. Therefore,
uncertified copies of evidential material
are sufficient for the purpose of a transport
safety investigation under this Bill.
Subclause
45(4) provides that the Executive Director may
examine or test evidential material even
if the examination or test results in damage or
destruction of that material. Destructive
testing is not normally carried out on evidential
material that is considered to be capable of
being returned to its owner for return to normal
service or repair, for example, a propeller
blade or the bogie of a rail vehicle. However,
the Executive Director may consider it necessary
on some occasions to carry out destructive
testing when there is no other suitable
alternative and the testing is in the interests
of transport safety. In such cases, the
Executive Director would consider, on a case by
case basis, permitting parties with a legitimate
interest to observe the testing process.
Subclause
45(5) requires that the Executive Director must
return evidential material when it is no
longer required for the purposes of a transport
safety investigation and is consistent with ATSB
policy. It is also recognised that other
agencies may have a legitimate right to the same
evidential material and the Executive
Director would not wish to unnecessarily
frustrate the progress of other investigations.
By returning the material to its owner, other
agencies may then exercise their rights to
access such material and obtain the material
from the owner. In addition, the owner of the evidential
material may be temporarily disadvantaged as
a result of evidential material being
held by the Executive Director for the purposes
of an investigation. For example, an aircraft or
ship may be delayed from returning to normal
service until such time as the evidential
material is returned. In such cases, the
Executive Director would only hold that material
for such time as was considered necessary for
the purpose of the investigation.
Subclause
45(6) and Subclause 45(7) provides a mechanism
for the Executive Director to provide evidential
material that is not OBR or restricted
information directly to other Commonwealth
and State authorities or to a coroner. Making
available such material is provisional on a
request in writing from the relevant authority
or coroner, and the Executive Director being
satisfied that making the material available
will not interfere with an investigation to
which the material relates. This clause is
intended to cover such items as transport
vehicle wreckage, components, baggage, goods and
documents or other evidence acquired at accident
sites or obtained under other provisions of the
Bill except when that information is OBR or restricted
information. Note that restricted
information includes information acquired
under compulsion in accordance with the
provisions of Clause 32 and paragraphs 36(3)(a)
and 36(4)(a) and is therefore subject to the
protection under Subclause 47(2).
Note
also that the provision of OBR or restricted
information to other authorities or to the
coroner, would be subject to Part 6 Protection
of OBR information and restricted information.
Subclause
45(8) explains that the owner includes an agent
of the owner and therefore allows evidential
material to be returned to an agent where
appropriate. For example, it is not unusual in
marine for most of the dealings in relation to
an investigation to be conducted through a
shipping agent acting on behalf of the owner. It
would also be impractical in some cases to
return material directly to the owner so an
arrangement with an agreed agent may need to be
made. In many cases, following an accident where
the vehicle suffers extensive damage, the owner
is deemed to be the insurer.
This
subclause also provides a list of those persons
or authorities that may be given evidential
material under Subclause 45(6).
Clause
46 Compensation for damage to electronic
equipment
This
clause provides detail on the circumstances in
which compensation for damage to electronic
equipment must be made when such equipment has
been operated by the Executive Director in
accordance with premises powers (Clause 36).
This is a common provision in other legislation
permitting operation of electronic equipment on
premises.
Clause
47 Self-incrimination not an excuse
Subclauses
47(1) and 47(2) clarify that whenever a person
is obliged to answer questions and produce evidential
material under provisions of this Bill (such
as Clause 32, paragraph 36(3)(a) or 36(4)(a))
that person cannot be excused from answering
those questions or providing that material on
the grounds that it might incriminate them or
make them liable for a penalty. These subclauses
also acknowledge that such coercive powers must
be accompanied by appropriate protections.
Therefore, information obtained directly or
indirectly as a result of answers to questions
or evidential material produced under
Clause 32, paragraph 36(3)(a) or 36 (4)(a),
cannot be admitted as evidence in criminal or
civil proceedings against the person who
provided the information or material. Note that
where the material provided is OBR information,
it is also inadmissible according to Clause 55
in relation to criminal proceedings against crew
members. Note also that the
use-derivative-use provisions of this clause are
consistent with Commonwealth legal policy.
Advice received from the Attorney Generals
Department indicated that the removal of the
derivative-use provisions would not be supported
unless significant empirical evidence was
provided as to how this provision had adversely
affected the operation of other statutes.
Notwithstanding, this clause does not prevent
other agencies from separately collecting the
same information that may then be admitted as
evidence.
Subclause
47(3) means that notwithstanding Subclause
47(2), information given in answer to the
Executive Directors questions may be used in
evidence in criminal proceedings concerning the
falsity of the information.
Subclause
47(4) clarifies that the immunity provided under
Subclause 47(2) overrides any other clauses in
this Bill dealing with the admissibility of
evidence in criminal or civil proceedings. For
example, OBR information cannot be admitted in
evidence against the person who provided the OBR
to the Executive Director, even where all the
conditions set out under Subclause 56(3) are
met.
Part
6 Protection of OBR information and restricted
information
Division
1 OBR information
Clause
48 Definition of OBR or on-board recording
Subclause
48(1) defines the meaning of on-board
recording or OBR. To fall within the
definition of an OBR, a recording must meet the
descriptions provided under paragraphs 48(1)(a),
(b), and (c), and also at least one of the
descriptions under paragraph 48(1)(d). This is
to ensure that there is a proper constitutional
basis for the provisions throughout the Bill
relating to OBRs. (Refer also to Clause 11)
Note
that the principles contained in this Division
relating to the disclosure and use of OBR
information are derived from existing
legislation and reflect standards and
recommended practices of international
agreements.
Control
area
is a generic name being used for the purposes of
this Bill. Refer to Explanatory Memorandum
comments at Clause 3 for examples of control
areas in different transport modes.
An
OBR may be in the form of a Cockpit Voice
Recording (CVR as referred to in aviation). It
is also the only form of control area recording
that is currently required by any law in
Australia (Commonwealth or State/Territory) and
is to be carried in certain classes of aircraft.
However, this legislation acknowledges that such
technology is carried in other forms of
transport and is likely to become mandatory in
the future. For example, there is already an
international program for the introduction of
laws that will require OBRs on certain classes
of ships. Therefore, such recordings will need
to be provided with the same protections as any
other similar recordings required by law.
Historically,
CVRs were required by law ONLY for the purposes
of transport safety investigation in recognition
of the fact that they had the potential to
provide vital information about the
circumstances and contributing factors of
accidents. In particular, CVRs were originally
intended only to be used to assist in the
investigation of occurrences where the flight
crew were fatally injured as a result of an
accident and were therefore unable themselves to
provide critical safety information about the
events immediately preceding the accident. CVR
information is now used more broadly in many
non-fatal accidents and serious incidents as the
information has also proven to be vital in those
cases.
It
is acknowledged that such recordings constitute
an invasion of privacy for the operating crew of
an aircraft that most other employees in
workplaces are not subject to. Such recordings,
therefore, must be treated with the utmost
confidentiality and continue to be used for
safety investigation purposes only. To ensure
the ongoing availability of information from
CVRs, it was considered necessary to protect the
rights of individuals, in particular the
operating crew of an aircraft. Inappropriate use
of CVR information in the judicial system, for
example, may adversely affect transport safety,
both domestically and internationally, as it is
unlikely that the availability and free flow of
safety information will be guaranteed/continued
in the future. Inappropriate use by an operator
such as for disciplinary action may also result
in an adverse outcome for transport safety. For
example, the operating crew of an aircraft has
the ability to deny access to CVR information
simply by pulling a circuit breaker, thus
rendering a CVR inoperative.
In
a recent case in New Zealand (NZ), the desire of
NZ police to prosecute a DASH-8 crew for an
operational error that led to an aircraft crash
resulted in strong ICAO/international criticism.
In this case, the police charged the crew with
manslaughter and seized the cockpit voice
recorder as evidence. These
actions subsequently led to NZ and foreign
aircrews pulling circuit breakers on CVR devices
when within NZ airspace and in doing so,
rendered the CVR inoperative. This effectively
denied access by investigators to vital
information for future safety investigations.
Aircrews were also less inclined to be
cooperative and forthcoming to safety
investigators in relation to their role in air
safety occurrences. At the time of the events
described above, NZ legislation did not provide
protection regarding the disclosure and use of
CVRs. Those tensions have since eased with a
change to NZ law that now provides similar
disclosure and use provisions for CVRs as those
provided in Australian legislation.
The
need to provide adequate protection to CVR
information was recently reaffirmed by the
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
in its Working Paper A33-WP/46 of 29 June 2001,
in which it expressed a concern about
inappropriate use of accident and incident
records in some Contracting States. ICAO
considered that accident and incident records
such as CVR recordings should be protected from
utilisation in disciplinary, civil,
administrative and criminal proceedings, and
from disclosure to the news media and the public. Therefore,
it proposed a resolution urging Contracting
States to examine, and if necessary, adjust
their laws, regulations and policies to protect
certain accident and incident records in order
to mitigate impediments to accident and incident
investigations.
Note
that a recording becomes an OBR within the
meaning of the Bill only upon the occurrence of
an immediately reportable matter as
prescribed by the regulations. However, once an immediately
reportable matter has occurred, the entire
recording becomes an OBR, including parts of the
recording made prior to the time of the
occurrence, unless and until such time as the
Executive Director declares that the recording
ceases to be an OBR (see Clause 49). Since a
recording is protected under Clauses 53, 54, 55,
56 and 59 as long as the recording remains an
OBR for the purposes of the Bill. The effect of
the definition under this subclause is that any
person is prevented from interfering with or
disclosing OBR information which relates to an immediately
reportable matter even before it may have
been reported under Clause 18 and before there
is any decision to investigate. This ensures
that, until otherwise indicated, this
information is protected and not used in any way
contrary to the provisions of this Bill.
Subclause
48(2) is a broader version of the definition of
OBR, and will capture a wider range of
recordings than the definition under Subclause
48(1). It is intended that in most
circumstances, the broader definition under
Subclause 48(2) will be adopted. However, where
there is doubt as to whether sufficient link to
the Commonwealths Constitutional power may be
established with respect to a particular
recording, the narrower definition under
Subclause 48(1) will be used in determining
whether that recording is an OBR.
Subclause
48(3) allows the Executive Director to declare
that a particular kind or class of recording
that might otherwise be interpreted under
Subclause 48(1) to be an OBR, is not an OBR for
the purposes of this Bill. For example, it may
be argued that a recording made at an Air
Traffic Control facility that includes some of
the sounds within the cockpit of an aircraft
could be construed as an OBR. To avoid doubt,
such recordings will be declared in the
regulations not to be an OBR. As recording
technology is rapidly changing, it was
considered appropriate to prescribe any
necessary exceptions within the regulations to
avoid either:
inadvertently
constraining the ability of the Executive
Director to provide discrete protections for an
OBR, which is a kind of recording with a unique
purpose; or
inadvertently
broadening those discrete protections to include
a kind of recording that was not intended to be
the subject of such protections.
It
must be noted that while a recording made at an
Air Traffic Control Centre, and equivalents in
other transport modes, may not be an OBR for the
purposes of this Bill, they would nevertheless
be classed as restricted information and
be subject to the considerable restrictions on
disclosure under Part 6 Division 2 Restricted
Information.
The
declaration under this Subclause 48(3) and the
regulations is different from the declaration
under Clause 49. Declaration under the
regulations would cover an entire class of
recordings of a specified nature, and once
declared, any recording within the specified
class would be outside the scope of the OBR
provisions. A declaration under Clause 49 only
relates to discrete recordings relating to a
specific occurrence. See Explanatory Memorandum
notes at Clause 49 for further explanation.
Subclause
48(4) defines constitutional journey
consistent with the Commonwealths constitutional
limits regarding transport safety investigation.
Clause
49 OBR ceasing to be an OBR under Executive
Directors declaration
This
clause enables the Executive Director to declare
that an OBR ceases to be an OBR. Subclause 49(1)
provides for a discretionary power to do so
while Subclauses 49(2) and (3) place obligations
on the Executive Director to make a declaration
under specified circumstances. Note that upon
such declaration, all protection for the OBR and
any related OBR information in respect of the
recording ceases. However, the recording may
still be protected as restricted information
under Division 2, Part 6.
Subclause
49(2) places an obligation on the Executive
Director where he or she elects not to
investigate an immediately reportable matter to
declare by published notice that any related OBR
is not an OBR for the purposes of the Bill. When
an OBR ceases to be an OBR under this subclause,
any related OBR information also ceases to be
OBR information (see Subclause 49(5)). By
declaring that the OBR has ceased to be an OBR,
other agencies with statutory rights to
investigate may do so without impediment, for
example, State rail, marine or OH&S agencies
and other Commonwealth agencies.
Subclause
49(3) places an obligation on the Executive
Director to declare by published notice that
parts of an OBR not relevant to a transport
safety matter that is being investigation under
the Bill, are not to be treated as an OBR on and
after the date specified. This allows those
parts of the OBR to be used for other purposes
such as training or for other investigations
being conducted by State, Territory and
Commonwealth agencies. Subclause 49(5) also
applies with respect to this subclause.
Subclause
49(4) states that once the Executive Director
has declared that an OBR ceases to be an OBR, he
or she cannot change/reverse that decision.
Clause
50 Executive Directors certificate about
disclosure of OBR information
This
clause enables the Executive Director to certify
that the disclosure of specified OBR information
is not likely to prejudice or interfere with any
investigation. Such certification is one of the
requirements to be met for OBR information to be
disclosed under paragraph 53(3)(d) and to be
admitted in evidence in civil proceedings under
Clause 56. Note that this certificate may also
be used to allow disclosure by a person who is
not the Executive Director for coronial
inquiries under paragraph 53(3)(d) (eg. if
police have obtained the OBR information under
paragraph 53(3)(b), it would be possible for the
coroner to obtain OBR information from the
police under paragraph 53(3)(d) rather than
directly from the Executive Director under
Clause 59).
Clause
51 Release of OBR information in the interests
of transport safety
This
clause permits the Executive Director to
publicly release OBR information for the
purposes of transport safety, notwithstanding
anything in the Bill to prevent disclosure of
such information. In practice, this is not a
decision taken lightly (refer to Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Subclause 48(1)). If
publicly released, OBR information would be
restricted to only those parts of the OBR that
are directly relevant to the circumstances and
analysis of the immediately reportable matter
and which could not be obtained by any other
means.
Note
that disclosure of OBR information under this
clause will not include personal information
except in the circumstances prescribed by the
regulations. It is intended that such
circumstances may include, for example, release
to Commonwealth regulatory authorities, police
or to State and Territory coroners for the
purposes of an investigation into the same
transport safety matter. Note that any personal
information released under Subclause 51(2) will
still be subject to protection under other
provisions within the Bill which place
restrictions on further disclosure of the OBR
information to any other parties.
Clause
52 Executive Director may authorise persons to
have access to OBR information
This
clause provides the Executive Director with a
discretionary power to grant general access to
OBR information to a person who falls outside
the definition of staff member either
generally or in relation to a specific
occurrence. Such a person may, for example, be a
temporary or non-ongoing employee who is not an
APS employee, or a contractor or consultant who
does not have delegated powers under this Bill.
This may become necessary in cases, for example,
where experts other than staff members are
required to assist with replaying and analysing
the contents of the OBR. For example, an
interpreter may be needed if the contents of the
OBR are in a foreign language, or an expert in
voice analysis may be required to provide expert
opinion on the content of the OBR. In accordance
with international agreements, there may be
other persons considered appropriate to have
access to OBR information. In most instances,
the Executive Director will consider such a need
on a case by case basis. Those persons will be
subject to the confidentiality provisions under
Clause 53 in relation to OBR information.
Clause
53 Copying or disclosing OBR information
Subclauses
53(1) and 53(2) prohibit copying or disclosure
of OBR information. Note that disclosure to a
court, including a coroner or a tribunal, is
also prohibited under this subclause, subject to
the exceptions under Subclause 53(3). Also note
that OBR information is defined under Clause 3
to include a copy or transcript of the OBR made
before or after the occurrence of the immediately
reportable matter that caused the recording
to become an OBR. This subclause reinforces the
notion that the confidentiality of this
information is considered to be of the utmost
importance and that it is to be used primarily
for the purpose of transport safety
investigation.
Subclause
53(3) provides the exceptions to the prohibition
under Subclauses 53(1) and (2). Such exceptions
include disclosure or copying in the course of
the exercise of powers under this Bill or in
connection with this Bill (paragraph 53(3)(a)).
This represents a normal part of the
investigation process where a team approach is
taken and where it may be necessary to disclose
the contents of an OBR to external experts and
others for the purposes of properly analysing
the significance of the information. While
paragraph 53(3)(b) allows copying or disclosure,
for example, to the police, for purposes of the
investigation of any offence against a law of
the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, it
should be noted that any OBR information so
disclosed would not be admissible in criminal
proceedings against crew members (see
Clause 55).
Under
paragraph 53(3)(c), disclosure to a court for
the purposes of criminal proceedings is only
allowed in criminal proceedings against someone
who is not a crew member, for example, in
relation to a hijack or in-flight violence.
Paragraph
53(3)(d) permits disclosure to a court in civil
proceedings (including coronial proceedings)
where the Executive Director has issued a
certificate under Clause 50 stating that the
disclosure is not likely to interfere with ANY
investigation, and the court or coroner has made
a determination under Subclause 53(4).
Disclosure of OBR information is also permitted
where a coroner has determined the information
to be no longer confidential (paragraph
53(3)(e)). As stated in the Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Clause 50, a person who
is not the Executive Director may disclose OBR
information for coronial inquiries under
paragraph 53(3)(d) (eg. if police have obtained
the OBR information under paragraph 53(3)(b), it
would be possible for the coroner to obtain OBR
information from the police under paragraph
53(3)(d) rather than directly from the Executive
Director under Clause 59).
Subclause
53(4) sets out the conditions under which a
court may order that the OBR information is
permitted to be disclosed under paragraph
53(3)(d)(ii). In essence, the court needs to
conduct a public interest test to weigh up the
relevance of the information in the
administration of justice against any adverse
impact of such disclosure on any current or
future investigation.
Subclause
53(5) allows the court to issue directions to
prohibit or restrict publication and
communication of the OBR information to any
person. This subclause ensures that the audience
is restricted to only those persons necessary
and keeps out other parties, for example, the
media, who may take the OBR information out of
context or use it for purposes other than
relating to the proceedings.
Subclause
53(6) clarifies that a person cannot be
compelled by a court to disclose OBR
information. In addition, where a person
discloses OBR information in contravention of
Subclause 53(1), that information cannot then be
admissible as evidence, thus removing any doubt
about the discretion of a court to admit such
evidence.
Clause
54 OBR information no ground for disciplinary
action
This
clause prevents any person from using OBR
information as the basis for a disciplinary
action against that persons employee. That
employee may be a crew member within the
meanings of the Bill or any other person. This
clause reinforces the notion that OBR
information is to be used for safety purposes
only and that, while there may be relevant
safety messages which arise from the OBR
information, it should be used in a constructive
way such as retraining, changing procedures etc.
and not for disciplinary action such as
dismissal or demotion.
Clause
55 OBR information not admissible in criminal
proceedings against crew members
This
clause prevents OBR information and any
information or thing derived from the use of OBR
information, from being admitted in evidence in
criminal proceedings against a crew member
except proceedings for an offence against the
Bill, such as Clause 24 for tampering with an
OBR in order to hinder an investigation.
Clause
56 Admissibility of OBR information in civil
proceedings
Subclause
56(1) allows OBR information to be admitted in
civil proceedings provided that the Executive
Director issues a certificate under Clause 50
certifying that the disclosure of the
information is not likely to prejudice or
interfere with any investigation, and that the
court makes an order under Subclause 56(3). Note
that these requirements are in addition to the
restrictions on the disclosure of OBR
information for purposes of civil proceedings
under paragraph 53(3)(d). A public interest
order will mean that the court will have to
perform a balancing act by weighing up the
potential domestic and international safety
impact on current or future investigations
against the proper administration of justice. In
conducting that balancing act, the court will
also need to take into account whether the
evidence can be obtained by other means. If the
court considers it is likely that the free flow
of safety information will be affected in future
because of the disclosure and use of the OBR
information, and that this impact outweighs the
administration of justice, then the court may
rule against disclosure (and conversely).
This
is consistent with international practice. Note
that this subclause does not allow admittance of
OBR information where such information is made
inadmissible by Subclause 47(2) which prevents
admittance of information in proceedings against
a person who has given that information without
being allowed to claim self-incrimination
privilege or penalty privilege according to
Subclause 47(1).
Subclause
56(2) allows a party to a proceeding to apply
for an order that OBR information be admissible
in the proceeding. The onus will be on the
parties to justify disclosure, rather than the
Executive Director having to continually take
privilege claims when disclosure is sought.
Subclause
56(3) sets out the conditions under which a
court may order that the OBR information is
admissible. In essence, the court needs to
conduct a public interest test to weigh up the
relevance of the information in the
administration of justice against any adverse
impact of such disclosure on any current or
future investigation. (For further explanation,
refer also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at
Subclause 56(1)). Note that a co-requirement for
admissibility is a certificate issued by the
Executive Director under Clause 50.
Subclause
56(4) provides that coronial inquiries do not
come under this clause. In other words, once OBR
information is permitted to be disclosed for the
purposes of a coronial inquiry under either
paragraph 53(3)(d) or Clause 59, it will be
admissible in the coronial proceedings.
Clause
57 Examination by a court of OBR information
under subsection 56(3)
This
clause places restrictions on who may be present
while a court is examining OBR information for
the purposes of making an order under Subclause
56(3). It also allows the court to issue
directions to prohibit or restrict publication
and communication of the OBR information to any
person. This clause ensures that the audience is
restricted to only those persons necessary and
keeps out other parties who may take the OBR
information out of context or use it for
purposes other than relating to the proceedings.
Clause
58 Where a court makes an order under subsection
56(3)
This
clause specifies that OBR information admitted
in a civil proceeding may not be used in
evidence for the determination of the liability
in the proceedings of a crew member but
may be used for such purposes with respect to
non crew members. It also allows the
court to issue directions to prohibit or
restrict publication and communication of the
admitted OBR information to any person. Refer
also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at
Clause 57.
Clause
59 Use of OBR information in coronial inquiries
Subclause
59(1) requires the Executive Director, at the
request of a coroner, to make OBR information
available to the coroner, unless the Executive
Director believes the coroners access to the
information is likely to interfere with any
investigation to which the OBR concerned
relates. For example, a particular transport
safety matter may still be under investigation
at the time of a coronial inquiry into that same
or related matter. In such cases, the Executive
Director may consider it inappropriate to
disclose the requested OBR information at that
time as it may prejudice that investigation if
that information was made public before the
investigation was completed. Note that this test
is easier to satisfy compared with the test
under Clause 53 for the disclosure by any person
(including a person who is not the Executive
Director), which requires the disclosure to be
unlikely to interfere with any investigation.
Subclause
59(2) means that the coroner must examine OBR
information in the privacy of the coroners
chambers (ie. interested parties to the coronial
proceedings and the public will be excluded)
before the coroner may make a determination that
the information should no longer be protected
from disclosure. Note that such a determination
will not make the information admissible in any
other proceedings where admissibility is
prevented by other clauses of this Bill.
Subclause
59(3) provides that the coroner may only make a
determination under Subclause 59(2) where the
information concerned is relevant and cannot be
obtained by an alternative means, and where any
adverse impact on a safety investigation is
outweighed by the public interest. Refer also to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Subclause
56(1).
Subclause
59(4) allows the coroner to issue directions to
prohibit or restrict publication and
communication of the OBR information to any
person. For further explanation, refer also to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause 57.
Subclause
59(5) makes it an offence to contravene a
direction by the coroner in respect of Subclause
59(4). This offence was included to remove any
doubt about whether there is any real legal
consequence attached to the contravention of a
coroners direction under Subclause 59(4).
Division
2 Restricted information
Clause
60 Limitations on disclosure etc. of restricted
information
Subclauses
60(1), (2) and (3) prohibit a person who is or
has been an staff member, or who has been
authorised to access restricted information
under Clause 62, from making a record of restricted
information, or disclosing the information
to any person. Restricted information
covers various types of sensitive information
acquired by a staff member under or in
connection with this Bill. For further
explanation and examples of restricted
information, refer to Explanatory Memorandum
comments at Clause 3.
Note
that disclosure to a court, including to a
coroner or a tribunal, is also prohibited under
this subclause. The restrictions on the
disclosure and admissibility of restricted
information referred to in Division 2 of
this Part, reinforce the notion that safety
investigation processes and those relating to
judicial proceedings, particularly criminal
proceedings, should be separate to ensure a
continued free flow of safety information. The
principles of this provision are derived from
existing legislation and reflect standards and
recommended practices of international
agreements. Note that nothing in Division 2 of
this Part prevents other agencies separately
collecting and using evidential material
that is restricted information for the
purposes of judicial and other proceedings.
Subclause
60(4) provides the exceptions to the prohibition
under Subclause 60(1), (2) and (3). Such
exceptions include disclosure or copying in the
course of the exercise of powers under this Bill
or in connection with this Bill (refer also to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Subclause
53(3)). This subclause allows disclosure to a
court for purposes of criminal proceedings for
an offence against this Bill, for example,
providing false information, which is an offence
under Clause 24 as well as an offence under the Criminal
Code. In addition, this subclause allows
disclosure to a court in civil proceedings where
the Executive Director has issued a certificate
under Subclause 60(5) and the court makes a
public interest order under Subclause 60(6).
Note that information disclosed as permitted
under Subclause 60(4) will be admissible in
court proceedings, subject to Subclause 47(2),
which prevents admission of information in
proceedings against a person where the person
has given that information without being allowed
to claim self-incrimination privilege or penalty
privilege.
Subclause
60(5) enables the Executive Director to certify
that the disclosure of the restricted
information is not likely to prejudice or
interfere with any investigation.
Subclause
60(6) allows the court to order disclosure of restricted
information if it is satisfied that any
adverse impact on transport safety investigation
is outweighed by the public interest (refer also
to Explanatory Memorandum comments at Subclause
56(1)).
Subclause
60(7) allows the court to issue directions to
prohibit or restrict publication and
communication of the restricted information
to any person. Refer also to Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Clause 57.
Subclause
60(8) prevents a court from requiring a person
to disclose restricted information. This
subclause also clears up any doubt about the
discretionary power of a court in relation to
the admissibility of evidence. This means that
restricted information is not admissible as
evidence in civil or criminal proceedings where
disclosure of that information is not permitted
under the provisions of this Bill, for example,
a person discloses information to a court in
contravention of Subclause 60(1), (2) or (3).
However, this subclause does not prevent
admittance of restricted information in
evidence against a person for disclosing restricted
information in contravention of Subclause
60(1), (2) or (3) itself.
Clause
61 Release of information in the interests of
transport safety
This
clause provides the Executive Director with a
discretionary power to publicly disclose restricted
information for the purposes of transport
safety. Such release may be by way of publishing
a report under Clause 25 containing such
information, or by any other methods. One of the
only means to ensure that safety issues arising
from an investigation into a transport safety
matter reaches the broadest possible audience is
to publicly release relevant safety information.
Transport operators, transport regulatory
agencies and the transport industry in general,
have the capacity to address those safety issues
and therefore must have this information made
available to them. In addition, the Government
and the travelling public expect an open and
transparent process regarding the communication
of and actions to address, safety issues. This
is important in order to achieve public
confidence in the safety of transport.
Note
that disclosure of restricted information
under this clause will not include personal
information except in the circumstances
prescribed by the regulations. It is intended
that such circumstances may include, for
example, release to Commonwealth regulatory
authorities, police or to State and Territory
coroners for the purposes of an investigation
into the same transport safety matter. Note that
any personal information released under
Subclause 61(2) will still be subject to
protection under Clause 60 which places
restrictions on disclosure of restricted
information, although such restrictions only
apply to current or former staff members or
someone who has been authorised to access the
information under Clause 62.
Clause
62 Executive Director may authorise persons to
have access to restricted information
This
clause provides for authorisation, at the
Executive Directors discretion, of a person who
is not a staff member, to allow general
access to restricted information either
generally or in relation to a specific
occurrence. Such a person may, for example, be a
temporary staff member who is not an APS
employee, or a contractor or consultant who does
not have delegated powers under this Bill. For
further explanation, refer also to Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Clause 52.
Division
3 - Miscellaneous
Clause
63 Powers of Parliament and Royals Commissions
not affected
This
clause clarifies that the restrictions on
disclosure of information under the Bill do not
prevent the Commonwealth Parliament or a Royal
Commission from gathering information for the
purposes of their proceedings.
The
legislation reflects the need for the ATSB to
act as independently
as possible in the interests of transport safety
and provides considerable protection against the
disclosure and inappropriate use of OBR
information and restricted information.
However, the Parliament or a Royal Commission
can access OBR information and Restricted
Information and are not subject to the
hurdles that civil or criminal courts are
subject to. This is in recognition of the fact
that Parliamentary and Royal Commission
proceedings are inquisitorial (as opposed to
adversarial) in nature and that both the
Parliament and Royal Commissions have wide
powers to gather evidence for their own
investigations. Parliament and Royal
Commissions, therefore, reserve the right to
call upon the ATSB to assist in providing
evidence to their inquiries, especially when the
manner in which ATSB conduct their investigation
is the focus of such inquiries for
accountability purposes.
Nevertheless,
in assisting with such inquiries, the ATSB would
explain the confidentiality issues and
restrictions normally applicable to the
disclosure and use of such information. Members
of those inquires would be requested to
carefully consider the potential domestic and
international safety implications resulting from
the disclosure of that material before making a
determination about whether it was necessary to
disclose that information for the purpose of the
inquiry.
Part
7 Miscellaneous
Clause
64 Immunity
This
clause makes it clear that a person is not
liable for anything done (or omitted to be done)
in good faith, when exercising powers under the
Bill. This clause reflects the common law
position and is merely enacted to avoid doubt.
Clause
65 Certification by Executive Director of staff
members involvement in investigation
This
clause allows the Executive Director to certify
that a specified person who is or was a staff
member, was involved in a particular
investigation. This certification will serve the
purpose of exempting a current or former staff
member from complying with a court direction
that is not a coroners direction (see Clause 66)
to give evidence in court proceedings. Note that
this provision is discretional and where, for
example, a staff member has been a
material witness to an occurrence, it would be
possible for the Executive Director to not issue
a certificate under this clause, so that the staff
member may be compelled to appear at the
relevant court proceeding.
Clause
66 Staff members etc. not compellable as
witnesses
Subclause
66(1) provides that where the Executive Director
has issued a certificate under Clause 65, the
current or former staff member specified in the
certificate is not obliged to comply with a
court direction to give evidence relating to an
investigable matter.
It
is considered important, in the interests of
maintaining trust and a free flow of safety
information, that any current or former staff
member who is involved, or has been
involved, in the investigation of a transport
safety matter (including those having access to
OBR and restricted information), should
maintain a distance from the judicial system,
the focus of which is primarily on blame or
liability. It was considered appropriate to
include former staff members in this
provision to ensure that the confidentiality of
sensitive information, including OBR and restricted
information, is maintained in the interests
of transport safety.
Subclause
66(2) exempts a staff member from giving expert
opinion in civil or criminal proceedings in
relation to any matter relating to transport
safety. For example, a particular staff member
may be considered to be a subject expert in
materials failure analysis. As such, a court
could not compel that a staff member to
appear in a criminal or civil proceeding simply
by virtue of their expertise (refer also to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause 65).
Note that this provision applies to current staff
members only as it was not considered
appropriate to place such restrictions on former
staff members simply because of their
technical expertise about aspects of transport
safety rather than their direct involvement in
an investigation under this Bill.
Subclause
66(3) provides that coronial inquiries are
excluded from the operation of this clause. In
other words, staff members cannot be exempted
from attending coronial proceedings.
Every
effort has been made in the legislation to
separate safety investigations from legal
processes. However, it is accepted that coroners
have a legitimate role to play in determining
the manner and cause of death and that the cause
of death is not legally limited to providing
simplistic explanations such as death from
traumatic injuries sustained as a result of an
aircraft accident. The legal role of coroners is
not entirely dissimilar to that of the Executive
Director. Both conduct inquisitorial inquiries,
which are not bound by formal rules of evidence.
Both are empowered to investigate to determine
the underlying reasons for a death and to make
recommendations to ensure that accidents
resulting in death and injury do not recur. It
was therefore considered appropriate to assist
coroners when requested to do so. Such
assistance also ensures that the coroner is
provided with unbiased information about the
circumstances of a fatal accident.
Note
that even where a staff member is
compellable to give evidence for purposes of a
court proceeding, disclosure of OBR and restricted
information in providing evidence to a
coroner or to other courts will still be subject
to the restrictions under Part 6 of the Bill.
Clause
67 Attendance fees where staff members attend
coronial inquiry
This
clause provides that a staff member
requested to appear in a coronial inquiry to
give expert opinion, or who is the subject of a
certificate issued by the Executive Director
under Clause 65, must be reimbursed for the
expenses of that attendance.
Clause
68 Legal representation for staff members at
coronial inquiry
This
clause provides that a staff member
requested to appear in a coronial inquiry to
give expert opinion, or who is the subject of a
certificate issued by the Executive Director
under Clause 65, is entitled to legal
representation at that inquiry. Normally,
witnesses have no automatic right to legal
representation at a coronial inquiry, although
coronial legislation in some jurisdictions may
allow such representation with the leave of the
coroner. This clause will ensure that the staff
member may be represented by a lawyer
without the leave of the coroner. Legal
assistance at coronial inquiries will allow
investigators to focus on their role as an
assistant to the coroner in providing expert
opinion, or as a witness, and not in defending
the findings of the investigation to legal
representatives with interests other than
transport safety. This will also ensure that the
focus of the coroners inquiry is not drawn away
from transport safety to issues of blame and
liability by legal representatives of other
parties who may be at the coronial inquiry for
the purpose of preparing the groundwork for a
case in subsequent civil or criminal
proceedings.
Clause
69 Staff members may exercise powers under State
and Territory laws
This
clause clarifies the Parliaments intention to
allow staff members to exercise powers
conferred upon them on a case by case basis
under any State or Territory legislation that
relates to transport safety, provided that such
the State or Territory does not impose an
obligation either expressly or impliedly on the staff
members to perform the relevant functions.
Note that transport is defined in the
Bill to include air, sea or rail transport.
There may be occasions when State authorities
request the Executive Director to conduct an
investigation into a transport safety matter
where that transport safety matter does not fall
within the Executive Directors constitutional
jurisdiction to investigate. For example, a
State or Territory rail accreditation authority
may request that the Executive Director conduct
an investigation into an accident of a suburban
(intrastate) train. In such cases, the
Commonwealth officers can exercise investigation
powers under relevant State or Territory
legislation if approved by the Executive
Director.
Clause
70 Compensation for acquisition of property
This
clause provides for compensation for acquisition
of property where compensation is required for
constitutional reasons.
Clause
71 Regulations
This
clause allows regulations to be made where
required or permitted by this Bill, or where
necessary or convenient for the purposes of the
Bill.
TRANSPORT SAFETY INVESTIGATION (CONSEQUENTIAL
AMENDMENTS) BILL 2002
The
Transport Safety Investigation (Consequential
Amendments) Bill 2002 accompanies the Transport
Safety Investigation Bill 2002.
NOTES
ON CLAUSES
Clause
1 Short title
This
clause provides the proper title of the Bill.
Clause
2 Commencement
This
clause provides that the Bill commences on
receipt of Royal Assent. Note that the actual
amendments contained in the Schedule do not
commence until the Transport Safety
Investigation Bill 2002 (the main Bill)
commences.
Clause
3 Schedules
This
clause means that the amendments made by the
main Bill to other legislation are set out in
the Schedule.
Schedule
1 Amendments
Air
Navigation Act 1920
Item
1 provides that Part 2A (Investigation of
Accidents etc.) of the Air Navigation Act
1920 will be removed from that Act in its
entirety. Subject to the transitional
arrangements (see item 2), all investigations of
aviation safety occurrences are to be conducted
under the main Bill once it commences.
Item
2 provides for the transitional arrangements for
any aviation investigation that has been
completed or is under investigation at the time
that Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920
is repealed. This includes investigations that
have completed or yet to be completed, and
investigations that have been discontinued
before the repeal.
Such
investigations will continue to be covered by
the provisions of the repealed legislation. All
investigations that commence on the date that
the main Bill becomes effective will be
conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the main Bill.
Air
Services Act 1995
Item
3 amends paragraph 8(1)(c) of the Air
Services Act 1995 to reflect the new
arrangements under the main Bill regarding
aviation safety, by replacing the reference to
the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation with a
reference to the Executive Director of Transport
Safety Investigation.
Australian
Maritime Safety Authority Act 1990
Item
4 provides for an additional paragraph 6(1)(ca)
relating to cooperation to be inserted in the Australian
Maritime Safety Authority Act 1990. This
amendment was included to ensure consistency
with similar clauses contained in the Air
Services Act 1995 and the Civil Aviation
Act 1988 (as referred to in the notes on
Item 3 and Item 5 in this Explanatory
Memorandum).
Civil
Aviation Act 1988
Item
5 provides an amendment to paragraph 9(3)(a) of
the Civil Aviation Act 1988 to reflect
the new arrangements under the main Bill
regarding aviation safety, by replacing the
reference to the Bureau of Air Safety
Investigation with a reference to the Executive
Director of Transport Safety Investigation.
Freedom
of Information Act 1982
Item
6 deletes the reference to Air Navigation Act
1920, subsection 19CU(1) from Schedule 3 of
the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (the
FOI Act). Schedule 3 of the FOI Act provides a
list of secrecy provisions contained in various
Acts. Any information covered by the specified
secrecy provisions is automatically exempt in
accordance with Section 38 of the FOI Act.
Note
that Subsection 19CU(1) of Part 2A of the Air
Navigation Act 1920 refers to any part of a
report or document that was given to the
Secretary under Subsection 19CT of that Act.
Other information collected under Part 2A of the
Air Navigation Act 1920 is currently
subject to various confidentiality provisions
contained in Part 2A.
Item
7 inserts a reference to the new confidentiality
provisions contained in the main Bill into
Schedule 3 of the FOI Act, thereby making any
information covered by the new provisions
automatically exempt from release under the
freedom of information legislation. The
information referred to in this item includes on-board-recording
(OBR) information and restricted information.
The wider application of the FOI exemption is in
compliance with Australias international
obligation to protect information collected in
the course of no-blame safety investigations.
Navigation
Act 1912
Item
8 repeals paragraph 425(1)(ea) which provides
that the Governor General may make regulations
for and in relation to the investigation of, and
reporting on, casualties affecting ships, or
entailing loss of life on or from ships. Repeal
of this paragraph would effectively repeal the Navigation
(Marine Casualty) Regulations 1990, which
were made under paragraph 425(1)(ea). Provisions
in relation to the investigation of safety
occurrences relating to ships and marine
navigation will be covered under the main Bill
when it commences.
Item
9 repeals Subsection 425 (1AAA) which provides
that Section 2 (Application) of the Navigation
Act 1912 does not apply in relation to the
investigation of, and reporting on, casualties
affecting ships, or entailing loss of life on or
from ships. This allowed investigations to be
conducted into incidents involving vessels to
which the Act did not apply but for this
paragraph. For example, if a ship to which the
Act applied was in collision with a ship to
which the Act did not apply, the Inspector of
Marine Accidents would investigate and regard
both vessels as coming under the provisions of
the Regulations. This paragraph is redundant as
the safety investigation of ships and marine
navigation will be covered under the main Bill
when it commences.